Article 13
“Among the things that concern the good of the Church and indeed the welfare of society here on earth-things therefore that are always and everywhere to be kept secure and defended against all injury-this certainly is preeminent, namely, that the Church should enjoy that full measure of freedom which her care for the salvation of men requires.(31)”
The freedom of the Church is dogma, as an educated Catholic layperson would know.[1] The footnote cites two letters of Pope Leo XIII. In one, “Officio Sanctissimo,” the pope wrote:
“Of the rights of the Church that it is Our duty everywhere and always to maintain and defend against all injustice, the first is certainly that of enjoying the full freedom of action she may need in working for the salvation of souls. This is a divine liberty, having as its author the only Son of God, Who by shedding of blood, gave birth to the Church Who established it until the end of time, and chose Himself to be its Head. This liberty is so essential to the Church, a perfect and divine institution, that they who attack this liberty at the same time offend against God and their duty.”[2]
“This is a sacred freedom, because the only-begotten Son endowed with it the Church which He purchased with His blood.”
A near repetition of a line from “Officio Sanctissimo.”
“Indeed it is so much the property of the Church that to act against it is to act against the will of God.”
Another such repetition.
“The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.”
This sentence raises two questions. If the freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle of Church/State relations, why did the council fathers bury the principle in article 13? Should not they have started their exposition with the fundamental principle? Two answers suggest themselves.
Perhaps the council fathers’ choice is consistent with the confusing nature of Dignitatis humanae. No definitions, vague generalizations, and unsupportive citations. Simply add to this list the failure to state the fundamental principle at the start.
Alternatively, Dignitatis humanae is not about “the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.” It is about something else, hence the late reference to this particular fundamental principle. If so, then the challenge is to identify the topic of the document. Is it possible the document is really about the relations between non-Church (i.e. non-Catholic) religions and governments and the whole civil order? This question is addressed a few sentences hence.
“In human society and in the face of government the Church claims freedom for herself in her character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord, upon which there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the whole world and preaching the Gospel to every creature.(32)”
Once again, a clear statement of dogma regarding the freedom of the Church. The footnote cites Mk. 16:15, Matt. 28:18-20, and an encyclical of Pope Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, the cited portion of which includes the following:
“Accordingly We, as representatives on earth of Him Who was proclaimed by the Prophet “Prince of Peace” (Isaias ix. 6) appeal to the rulers of the peoples, and to those who can in any way influence public life, to let the Church have full liberty to fulfill her role as educator by teaching men truth, by inculcating justice and inflaming hearts with the Divine Love of Christ.”[3]
“The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of the Christian faith.(33)”
A confusing sentence because the distinction between it and the preceding sentences is unclear. The term “also” (partier[4]) implies an addition of some sort. But what is being added? Turning to the footnote, the council fathers cite an encyclical of Pope Pius XI, Firmissimam Constantiam.[5] The cited portion includes the following:
“[I]t must be admitted that for Christian life to develop itself it must have recourse to external and sensible means; that the Church, being a society of men, cannot exist or develop if it does not enjoy liberty of action, and that its members have the right to find in civil society the possibility of living according to the dictates of their consciences. Consequently, it is quite natural that when the most elementary religious and civil liberties are attacked, Catholic citizens do not resign themselves passively to renouncing those liberties. Notwithstanding, the revindication of these rights and liberties can be, according to the circumstances, more or less opportune, more or less energetic.”[6]
The cited material does not clear up the confusion. The pope was discussing a particular situation in Mexico with respect to Catholic Action. If the point of the citation is merely that Catholics need freedom to follow their consciences, it appears only another way of describing the freedom of the Church.
“In turn, where the principle of religious freedom is not only proclaimed in words or simply incorporated in law but also given sincere and practical application, there the Church succeeds in achieving a stable situation of right as well as of fact and the independence which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission.”
Read one way, this sentence appears to explain why the (traditional) principle of Church/State relations, the freedom of the Church, was set aside for a lengthy prior discussion of the (new) principle of religious freedom. It could seem as if the council fathers were indeed focusing on relations between non-Church (i.e. non-Catholic) religions and governments and the whole civil order, as suggested above. They just expected that when non-Catholic people were given their due, the Church would be protected as well.
But that reading is not necessary. Especially if some passages in the opening articles which seem to privilege Catholicism are kept in mind, this sentence could mean the council father did not offer the “principle of religious freedom” as a protection for non-Catholic religions, but for the Church herself. In order to succor the traditional doctrine of the freedom of the Church, the council fathers were proposing the new doctrine of religious freedom. In this view, the fathers set out a different framework for the freedom of the Church, one based on liberal principles, to replace the older concordat framework.
Such an assertion would take us beyond what an educated Catholic layperson would typically understand, however. On a laypersons’ reading, the sentence seems an optimistic assertion that if everyone is free, Catholics will be as well. Confusingly, the following sentences seem to support both readings.
‘This independence is precisely what the authorities of the Church claim in society.(34)”
Another reference to the freedom of the Church, which the council father now say is “precisely” what they want. An educated Catholic layperson might ask, if that were so, why the fathers waited so long to say it? The choice to clarify “precisely” what one wants late in a document, after so much discussion, is rhetorically inexplicable.
The footnote is to a page of Ci Riesce, a 1953 allocution of Pope Pius XII, which discusses the concordat framework then in place.[7] The first sentence of the following quote begins on the page prior to that cited by the council fathers, but the entire sentence is included here for context:
“The ideas We have set forth may also be useful for the Catholic jurist and statesman when, in their studies or in the exercise of their profession, they come in contact with the agreements (Concordats, Treaties, Agreements, <Modus vivendi>, etc. ) which the Church (that is to say, for a long time now, the Apostolic See) has concluded and still concludes with sovereign states. The Concordats are for her an expression of the collaboration between the Church and State. In principle, that is, in theory, she cannot approve complete separation of the two powers. The Concordats, therefore, must assure to the Church a stable condition in right and in fact in the State with which they are concluded, and must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her divine mission.
It is possible that the Church and the State proclaim in a Concordat their common religious conviction; but it may also happen that a Concordat have, together with other purposes, that of forestalling disputes with regard to questions of principle and of removing from the very beginning possible matters of conflict. When the Church has set her signature to a Concordat, it holds for everything contained therein. But, with the mutual acknowledgment of both high contracting parties, it may not hold in the same way for everything. It may signify an express approval, but it may also mean a simple tolerance, according to those two principles which are the norm for the co-existence (<convivenza>) of the Church and her faithful with the civil powers and with men of another belief.”[8]
A book could be written contrasting the world view governing Ci Riesce with that reflected in Dignitatis humanae. An educated Catholic layperson could only wonder how the two fit together. After all, the council fathers cited Ci Riesce to support what they said they wanted in Dignitatis humanae. But Ci Riesce described negotiated settlements between the Church and “the civil powers,” with the explicit statement that some settlements were less than ideal—“it may also mean a simple tolerance.” By contrast, Dignitatis humanae seems to presume one generalized arrangement, what the council fathers called “religious liberty”—but without defining their terms—and they omitted the word “tolerance” from their document.
“At the same time, the Christian faithful, in common with all other men, possess the civil right not to be hindered in leading their lives in accordance with their consciences.”
This sentence, after one which focused on the freedom of the Church, returns to concern for non-Catholics, implying again that what works for non-Catholics will work for Catholics. It also features the document’s penultimate use of “conscience.” And just as the scope of these sentences keeps changing, from the freedom of Catholics to the freedom of all (including Catholics), so the scope of conscience likewise shifts. Here, conscience means whatever a person believes; in the next article it will be much more circumscribed.
As already discussed, the fact “conscience” is used equivocally frustrates the analysis. In this instance, do the fathers mean a properly-formed conscience? What about a depraved conscience? The fathers say the conscience of “all other men” is “in common” with the “Christian faithful,” so are they excluding bad consciences, or should the government treat the consciences of the Christian faithful no differently than those of others? An educated Catholic layperson could think such distinctions important, yet they are not made.[9]
“Therefore, a harmony exists between the freedom of the Church and the religious freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and communities and sanctioned by constitutional law.”
A clear statement that the council fathers thought the freedom of the Church and religious freedom are distinct. If so, then the freedom of the Church is not religious freedom, and religious freedom is not the freedom of the Church. There is, however, a “harmony” between them.
An educated Catholic layperson would need to know the nature of this harmony to apply the teaching of Dignitatis humanae in practical affairs. For example, is the harmony automatic? If one of the pair is achieved, does the other follow? Or can one exist without the other? Moreover, can they be in tension, or even in contradiction? What does history show, and what do the notions themselves lead us to expect?
Dignitatis humanae does not explicitly address these questions. Implicitly, however, the document seems to acknowledge that the freedom of the Church can exist without religious freedom. Given the fathers concerned themselves with the aspirations of contemporary men, and given their intent to develop the doctrine of recent popes, they apparently believed the Church had previously emphasized her own freedom without much concern for the freedom of other religions. An educated Catholic layperson would not only accept this admission but would further know that the Church had at times strongly encouraged the repression of other religions. So at least one of the pair, the freedom of the Church, can exist without the other.
The important question, then, is whether religious freedom can exist without the freedom of the Church? This question does not appear to have occurred to the council fathers. Or, at least, they did not discuss it. Why?
To address the question, the council fathers would have to define “religion.” If “religion” included belief systems committed to the extermination of Catholicism, for example, the fathers would have to explain how the freedom of such systems is compatible with the freedom of the Church. If religion were never defined, however, the question could be elided, which is a good description of Dignitatis humanae generally.
A similar analysis is possible for “conscience,” “right,” “due limits,” and “public order.” The council fathers never dealt with the possibility that religious freedom could impinge on the freedom of the Church because they did not consider what freedom for error might do to the consciences of Catholics, nor how rights which are wrong might press on Catholics, nor whether Catholics can fully live their faith when the only thing restraining vice is a bare regard for due limits or public order.
If it is argued the council fathers did consider these things, and that their determination was for a religious freedom which is consistent with the freedom of the Church, an educated Catholic layperson could reply that we still need to know how to achieve that harmony, and the fathers neglected to teach on the point. Platitudes like the one found in this sentence, “the religious freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and communities and sanctioned by constitutional law,” do not answer the question. “Do good,” the father seem to say, “and good will come of it.” Okay, but what is good, and how should Catholics respond when good is confronted with determined and aggressive evil?
Significantly, the concordant framework was focused on these very questions. As the cited portion of Ci Riesce shows, the Church had previously begun with her own freedom and worked toward achieving it, even in situations of disregard for or hostility to Catholic rights. Did the council fathers assume this would still be the case? Did they imagine a religious freedom which would start from, and continue to protect, the freedom of the Church? If they did, they did not make themselves clear.
Conclusion to article 13
The theme of these essays has been that Dignitatis humanae is confusing to an educated Catholic layperson, and thus is, to that extent, a rhetorical failure. But the human mind seeks order, and it seems natural for our species to impose, if necessary, a narrative structure on events. The final sentence of this article suggests such a structure to an educated Catholic layperson who is both native to the United States of America and of sufficient age.
Consider the sentence again: “Therefore, a harmony exists between the freedom of the Church and the religious freedom which is to be recognized as the right of all men and communities and sanctioned by constitutional law.” If weighed not as a statement of principle but of fact, the sentence fits the situation in the United States circa 1965, the year Dignitatis humanae was adopted by the Second Vatican Council. The Church in the United States had freedom in 1965, granted under a regime of religious freedom recognized as the right of all men and communities, and sanctioned by constitutional law.
But an educated Catholic layperson of any background would also understand that history moves on, exchanging the ethos of one age for another, and that not all are friendly to the Church.[10] Describing how things could go is not the same as acknowledging how they might go. The council fathers offered a doctrine regarding religious freedom without overtly considering what it might mean for the freedom of the Church, the latter of which they called the “fundamental principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.” How they could do so is just another basis for confusion.
[1]Referring to “the freedom of the Church (‘libertas Ecclesiae’).” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶ 445, retrieved on March 6, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[2] Paragraph 13, retrieved on March 6, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_22121887_officio-sanctissimo.html; Acta Sanctae Sedis 20 (1887), p. 269. The English version mistakenly cites to the Acta Apostolicae Sedis for this and the other letter, the latter being found at ASS 19 (1886-1887), p. 465.
[3] Paragraph 95, retrieved on March 26, 2024 from: https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_20101939_summi-pontificatus.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 31 (1939), pp. 445-446.
[4] Dignitatis humanae (Latin), art. 13, retrieved on March 26, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_lt.html.
[5] The footnote refers to Firmissiman Constantiam as a “letter,” but the Vatican website groups it under Pius XI’s encyclicals.
[6] Paragraph 25, retrieved on March 26, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/ documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19370328_firmissimam-constantiam.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 29 (1937), p. 196.
[7]A search of the Vatican website failed to locate the allocution, apart from its publication in the Acta Apostolica Sedes 45 (1953), p. 802, retrieved on March 28, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-45-1953-ocr.pdf. The A.A.S. version is in Italian.
[8] Retrieved on March 28, 2024, from: https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/ci-riesce-8948.
[9] “’Yes, the hour is coming for everyone who kills you to think that he is offering worship to God.” Jn. 16:2.
[10]“The Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, continues the mission of Christ himself in the course of history. Christians must, therefore, proclaim to everyone the Good News borne by Christ; and, following his path, they must be ready for self-sacrifice, even unto martyrdom.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶ 173, retrieved on March 30, 2024, from: https://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/ archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.