Article 1
“A sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man, (1) and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by coercion but motived by a sense of duty.”
The opening clause does not identify a human agent for the change alleged, but rather an abstraction: “[a] sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself . . . . [Emphasis added.]” The manner in which the abstraction reflexively acts is left obscure. The locus of the impression is also indistinct: “the consciousness of contemporary man.”
The vague opening nevertheless features a footnote. The very vagueness of the clause raises a question whether the footnote is meant as supporting authority, supplemental explanation, or perhaps something else. This footnote and all those remaining, moreover, are prefaced with “Cf.”, an abbreviation meaning “compare.”[1] Such a preface similarly raises a question regarding the authority of the footnotes. Why should the reader only compare the document’s statement with the cited material, all taken from Scripture or from prior statements of popes and doctors of the Church, and not instead find direct support for the document’s statements in such sources?
In any event, the footnote cites Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris, and a Christmas 1944 radio message of Pope Pius XII. The footnote citations are to pages, not specific passages. The reader therefore must decide, without guidance other than textual correspondence, what on the cited page the council fathers intended to reference. That approach is followed here, with some reference to other parts of the cited documents when needed for context; any additions from non-cited pages are noted.
In Pacem in Terris, John XXIII first discussed a perceived trend towards republican, constitutional governments, and he then stated the following on the page cited:
“78. We must, however, reject the view that the will of the individual or the group is the primary and only source of a citizen’s rights and duties, and of the binding force of political constitutions and the government’s authority.
79. But the aspirations We have mentioned are a clear indication of the fact that men, increasingly aware nowadays of their personal dignity, have found the incentive to enter government service and demand constitutional recognition for their own inviolable rights. Not content with this, they are demanding, too, the observance of constitutional procedures in the appointment of public authorities, and are insisting that they exercise their office within this constitutional framework.”[2] [Footnote omitted.]
On the second page of Pacem in Terris cited by the council fathers, John XXIII mentioned human dignity once again:
“34. Man’s personal dignity requires besides that he enjoy freedom and be able to make up his own mind when he acts. In his association with his fellows, therefore, there is every reason why his recognition of rights, observance of duties, and many-sided collaboration with other men, should be primarily a matter of his own personal decision. Each man should act on his own initiative, conviction, and sense of responsibility, not under the constant pressure of external coercion or enticement. There is nothing human about a society that is welded together by force. Far from encouraging, as it should, the attainment of man’s progress and perfection, it is merely an obstacle to his freedom.
35. Hence, before a society can be considered well-ordered, creative, and consonant with human dignity, it must be based on truth. St. Paul expressed this as follows: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, for we are members one of another.” And so will it be, if each man acknowledges sincerely his own rights and his own duties toward others.”[3]
The page of Pius XII’s radio message cited by the council fathers contains the following text mentioning dignity, which must be quoted at length for context:
“26. The elementary power of the masses, deftly managed and employed, the state also can utilize: in the ambitious hands of one or of several who have been artificially brought together for selfish aims, the state itself, with the support of the masses, reduced to the minimum status of a mere machine, can impose its whims on the better part of the real people: the common interest remains seriously, and for a long time, injured by this process, and the injury is very often hard to heal.
27. Hence follows clearly another conclusion: the masses—as we have just defined them—are the capital enemy of true democracy and of its ideal of liberty and equality.
28. In a people worthy of the name, the citizen feels within him the consciousness of his personality, of his duties and rights, of his own freedom joined to respect for the freedom and dignity of others.
29. In a people worthy of the name all inequalities based not on whim but on the nature of things, inequalities of culture, possessions, social standing—without, of course, prejudice to justice and mutual charity—do not constitute any obstacle to the existence and the prevalence of a true spirit of union and brotherhood.
30. On the contrary, so far from impairing civil equality in any way, they give it its true meaning; namely, that, before the state everyone has the right to live honorably his own personal life in the place and under the conditions in which the designs and dispositions of Providence have placed him.
31. As against this picture of the democratic ideal of liberty and equality in a people’s government by honest and far-seeing men, what a spectacle is that of a democratic state left to the whims of the masses:
32. Liberty, from being a moral duty of the individual becomes a tyrannous claim to give free rein to a man’s impulses and appetites to the detriment of others.
33. Equality degenerates to a mechanical level, a colorless uniformity the sense of true honor, of personal activity, or respect for tradition, of dignity—in a word all that gives life its worth— gradually fades away and disappears.
34. And the only survivors are, on the one hand, the victims deluded by the specious mirage of democracy, naively taken for the genuine spirit of democracy, with its liberty and equality; and on the other, the more or less numerous exploiters, who have known how to use the power of money and of organization, in order to secure a privileged position above the others, and have gained power.”[4]
These passages indicate the council fathers meant “dignity of the human person” to be a rational dignity grounded in truth, order, and personal responsibility. This reading of the footnote is confirmed by a sentence in art. 2 of Dignitatis humanae: “It is in accordance with their dignity as persons—that is, beings endowed with reason and freewill and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by nature to seek the truth, especially religious truth.” This sentence will be considered in its place, but for now it is as close to a formal definition of “dignity” that the council fathers came. The fact they did not place this definition earlier in their document, nor provide definitions for terms generally, is consistent with the rhetorically difficult structure of the document.
The second clause of the opening sentence, now in the passive voice (“the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own judgment . . . .”) is likewise unclear. The council fathers contrast “enjoying and making use of responsible freedom” and being “motivated by a sense of duty,” on the one hand, with being “driven by coercion,” on the other. The contrast is unclear because governments obviously may drive humans by coercion without violating their human dignity whenever personal judgments are sufficiently contrary to responsible freedom and duty. Incarcerating criminals is one example. The contrast would have been clear had the council fathers referred to unjust coercion in parallel with their specification of “responsible freedom,” but they did not. As the passage reads, it appears to raise a question about the validity of coercive governmental action generally.
“The demand is likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of the person and of associations.”
This sentence continues the uncertainty regarding the actors making the demand, but the demand does at least have an objective content. First, the council fathers refer to the juridical order, e.g., “constitutional limits” on “the powers of government.” Second, the council fathers link “rightful freedom” to that same juridical order, stating constitutional limits are demanded “in order that there may be no encroachments on the rightful freedom . . . . [Emphasis added.]” In other words, there is no suggestion here of the immediately prior and apparently subjective demand to act on one’s “own judgment.”
Taking this sentence together with the first, and considering also the texts cited in the footnote, one could perhaps overlook what seemed to be an initial, ingratiating attempt to appeal to the subjectivity of “contemporary man.” The council fathers are speaking of a truthful, orderly, responsible citizenry and government in these sentences, not absolute license. Human dignity sets limits to government rather than giving government autonomy from the order created by God.
“This demand for freedom in human society chiefly regards the quest for the values proper to the human spirit.”
Assuming the “values proper to the human spirit” are freedoms such as speech, religion, and assembly—what in the United States are called “First Amendment freedoms”—the council fathers say these are demanded more than other freedoms typically secured by government, such as movement, work, property, housing, food and water, sanitation, health care, etc. The fathers make no effort to substantiate their assertion.
“It regards, in the first place, the free exercise of religion in society.”
Here the council fathers identify the chief demand they perceived from “contemporary man”: “the free exercise of religion in society.” This is again an unsubstantiated assertion. Rhetorically, however, the assertion allows the fathers to transition from a political discussion to a theological one without first establishing a connection between the realms.
The maneuver also masks another omission. The council fathers have not yet addressed the basis of governmental authority: Why precisely does the person who rules have authority over others? By asserting allegedly contemporary sentiments about the nature of government, then asserting that these sentiments deal with religion, and next immediately shifting to the Church’s own authority, the council fathers avoid the question of governmental authority at the start of the document. It is a grave omission in a document purporting to apply theological analysis to governmental action.
“This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men.”
Another affirmation of the council fathers’ prior assertions. Here, as before, the identity of “men” is not specified.
“It proposes to declare them to be greatly in accord with truth and justice.”
A promise to support the council father’s prior assertions.
“To this end, it searches into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church—the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.”
A clear statement that the support for the prior assertions will be theological. The document’s progression is thus far clear: 1) humans have feelings about government, 2) these feelings are primarily religious, 3) the Church therefore may address them.
“First, the council professes its belief that God Himself has made known to mankind the way in which men are to serve Him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness.”
Here the council fathers teach something about the Church. An educated Catholic layperson would understand this sentence. The connection to politics remains unclear, however.
“We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men.”
An educated Catholic layperson would also understand this sentence, with the possible exception of the phrase “subsists in.” The verb means “to have existence” or “persist,”[5] which suggests the “one true religion” and the “Catholic and Apostolic Church” are somehow distinct. Can the “one true religion” be spread “abroad among all men” by anything else? Can things other than the “one true religion” be found within the “Catholic and Apostolic Church”? Dignitatis humanae does not address these questions.
“Thus He spoke to the Apostles: ‘Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have enjoined upon you’ (Matt. 28: 19-20).”
This is the first Bible quote in Dignitatis humanae, and it is also the first passage hinting at a common ground (beyond feelings) for politics and religion. The term “nations” is not necessarily political; it could be translated “peoples,” and an educated Catholic layperson would not read it as “nation states.”[6] However, such a person would read the “Great Commission,” as this text from the New Testament is known, to establish Catholicism as a universal religion.
The point is important because universal religions cause political problems. To the degree a universal religion starts within one nation or people, how does it spread without suggesting unity with the originating polity? Must there now be an empire of all who accept the religion? To the degree the religion starts within a previously existing empire, how does it spread within the empire without suggesting a new religious unity for the empire? Must there must be one religion as there is one empire? Must there ultimately be one religion as there is one world?
The document does not directly address these questions. Whether they are addressed tacitly is a matter of substantial confusion. More on this below.
“On their part, all men are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace the truth as they come to know it, and to hold fast to it.”
This sentence does nothing to lessen the force of the questions just raised over the political implications of a universal religion.
“This Vatican Council likewise professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their force.”
The following analysis will establish that “the human conscience” is one of the most important concepts in the document. Yet the council fathers do not define the term. An educated Catholic layperson would of course understand the Catholic definition of conscience.[7] But such a person would also understand that the term can be used in a variety of ways, including a conscience which instructs a person to commit objectively evil acts.[8] The father’s failure to specify how they are using “conscience” will prove, along with other missing definitions, fatal to the document’s clarity.
“The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.”
A vague sentence akin to those which opened the document. Once again, the agent is identified only by an abstraction; compare, “[a] sense of the dignity of the human person has been impressing itself more and more . . . ,” with “[t]he truth cannot impress itself except by virtue of its own truth . . . .[Emphasis added.]” Here, however, the abstraction is not just a feeling, the “sense” of contemporary man, but “truth,” which based on the document thus far, must have an objective status.
A question immediately arises: How can a government not impose objective truth, but rather leave such truth to impose itself? An educated Catholic layperson could understand how subjective truth might not be imposed in the political order. For example, a sincere opinion regarding economics might be accepted or rejected in a policy dispute. But if the council fathers have something to say about politics, and this has been their reference from the start, how can they now say that objective truth should not be imposed? Is it not obvious that governments impose the truth regarding the breaking point of concrete when writing a building code, and the truth regarding the progression of disease when establishing quarantine, and the truth regarding legal procedures when granting a law license? Most people would answer “yes,” and nothing indicates the council fathers would have answered differently.
So, do the council fathers intend to treat religious truth differently from other objective truths? A differential treatment seems to be the only way to resolve the document’s assertions. Note, for example, how a differential treatment of truth would fit the fathers’ reference in the prior sentence to “the human conscience,” something not typically understood to determine objective, non-religious truths like the breaking point of concrete, the progression of a disease, or the details of legal process, but rather matters within the moral and religious order.[9]
It appears, then, that while some objective truths may be imposed in politics, objective truths regarding religion may not. Whether the council fathers actually believed this, and why, will remain unclear through the rest of the document.
“Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.”
The term “coercion” now makes it second appearance, but unlike the first use, it is more circumscribed. The first use suggested that governmental coercion is wrong generally, but here the council fathers’ disapproval is linked specifically to coercion of religious practice. Notice as well that the fathers refer to “immunity” from coercion, which suggests coercion may have a place in other situations.
There is also a definition of sorts here. The council fathers say, “[r]eligious freedom . . . has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.” Does religious freedom have to do with anything else? Article 2 will show that it apparently does. As discussed later, the council father will appear to say religious freedom is not only a civil right (“immunity from coercion in civil society”), but also a natural right.
“Therefore it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.”
“Therefore” apparently refers to the predicate of the prior sentence, “has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.” The antecedent of the subject, “it,” is apparently also found in the prior sentence, “[r]eligious freedom.” Rendering the predicate as an adjective clause, and changing the pronoun to its antecedent, one reaches: “Religious freedom, which has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society, leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.”
At the outset, the sentence continues the document’s pattern of casting abstractions as actors. A “sense” first impressed itself, the “truth” then imposed itself, and now “religious freedom” leaves “untouched” traditional Catholic doctrine.
“Untouched” is, in any event, a difficult word. The council fathers earlier promised to teach on religious freedom, and yet here they promise to leave “untouched” the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ. How is this possible? Are these separate subjects? Or is the distinction chronological only, such that the council fathers have announced an intent to move on from the traditional teaching? The second suggestion is prompted by the next sentence of Dignitatis humanae, and it will be considered there. For now, the question remains whether religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine are separate subjects.
If they are, it would be very important to know the parameters of each. Indeed, as the present sentence is phrased, at the start of the document’s discussion of religious liberty, it would serve as a negative template for the following discussion. Whatever the council fathers’ meant by religious liberty, in other words, they could not be read to contradict or even touch on traditional Catholic doctrine.
Unfortunately for this view, the parameters of both religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine are unclear. As set out below, the document’s text never states the content of traditional Catholic doctrine. And, thus far at least, the council fathers have not explained “religious freedom” beyond stating its object—”immunity from coercion in civil society.” If the council fathers are here saying they intend to go only so far, and no farther, they do not clarify the boundary they have set for themselves.
To mention an example, it is unclear whether religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine are both theological concepts. Arguably, if religious freedom is a purely civil concept, but the traditional Catholic doctrine “on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ [emphasis added],” is theological, the former could be a separate matter open to amendment independently of traditional Catholic doctrine. After all, much of the language concerning religious freedom in the document thus far—”dignity of the human person,” “sense of duty,” “constitutional limits”—is more philosophical or legal than theological.
As already indicated, however, article 2 will state that religious freedom is a natural right, not a civil right only. Moreover, the council fathers have already affirmed in article 1 that they will search “into the sacred traditional and doctrine of the Church—the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that in harmony with the things that are old.” The council fathers thereby announced a theological agenda. An educated Catholic layperson could not easily conclude the council fathers intended to set aside their bishop’s miters for philosopher’s caps or judge’s robes when they explicitly stated otherwise.
What if the educated Catholic laity were to attempt setting the parameters for themselves? To what or to whom should they turn to learn the content of the traditional Catholic doctrine so they could compare it with the document’s teaching on religious freedom? Unfortunately, the council fathers do not say, and they provide no footnote for this sentence.
Some educated Catholic laity have nevertheless tried. Michael Davies published a book-length examination of Dignitatis humanae.[10] He spent several chapters on the traditional Catholic doctrine, providing extensive quotes from papal documents, theological treatises, and journal articles in support. He then examined the teachings of Dignitatis humanae on religious freedom, and, after a thorough discussion, expressed his confusion on whether the council fathers had actually left the traditional Catholic doctrine untouched:
“It is now possible to see clearly the apparent contradiction between the traditional papal teaching and the teaching of Dignitatis humanae, even though I shall not claim that a contradiction exists. All that I wish to do is to state that I do not see how the traditional teaching and that of Dignitatis humanae can be reconciled, which is a fact, and to ask the Magisterium to clarify the matter.”[11]
Davies, in other words, did not treat religious liberty and the traditional Catholic doctrine as separate subject matters. He thought they covered the same ground. There was no way, in his view, to see them as so distinct that when the council fathers added to the former, they left the latter untouched.
Arnold T. Guminski ran into the same dilemma when writing a response to Fr. Brian W. Harrison, O.S., who had written that the religious freedom teaching of Dignitatis humanae does not contradict traditional Catholic doctrine.[12] Fr. Harrison responded to Guminski’s article, and his first point was to establish that his critic has misread the traditional doctrine:
“In a previous issue of this journal, Mr. Arnold T. Guminski has criticized the ensemble of my own writings, published between 1988 and 1993, upholding the doctrinal continuity between the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae (DH), and traditional Catholic doctrine regarding Church, State, and religious toleration. In this response, I hope to defend substantially my position, while also correcting and clarifying it on some points in the light of my critic’s observations.
I. Guminski vs. Harrison: the status quaestionis
It will be helpful to begin by trying to summarize as clearly as possible the central issue about which Mr. Guminski and I continue to disagree. First of all, among those points that I believe we agree upon, the following reading of the traditional magisterium (let us call it proposition X) has particular relevance for our discussion:
X: According to pre-conciliar Catholic doctrine, there can be (or have been) circumstances wherein government prohibition of all public (and, under Old Testament and medieval circumstances, even private) religious manifestations other than those of the true religion does/did not involve the violation of any natural human right.
While Mr. Guminski would agree with that, he appears to think the traditional doctrine went a good deal further in its severity. For he opines that, “according to pre-conciliar papal doctrine . . . there is no natural right whatever to freely (i.e., to be immune from coercion by civil authority) engage in the public manifestation or propagation of any non-Catholic religion.” His expression, “no natural right whatever,” especially given his italicization of the last word, sounds as though it is equivalent, in his mind, to “never under any circumstances any natural right.” If so, then I disagree. Certainly, pre-Vatican-II papal doctrine never positively taught that there could in fact be circumstances in which non-Catholics might have a natural right to the said immunity. But neither, as far as I can see, did the teaching of the magisterium (as distinct from that of certain theologians) exclude such a possibility, especially as regards societies with non-Catholic or non-Christian majorities. My view has consistently been that this question was left obscure and undecided in the traditional magisterium, and that the essential development (i.e., non-contradictory change) in Catholic doctrine brought about by DH has been to clarify and answer it. The Declaration’s new and authoritative answer is that there can indeed be circumstances wherein governmental prohibition of public non-Catholic religious activity—at least in its normal and more innocuous forms—would violate the natural right to religious freedom of the non-Catholics in question. [Internal footnotes omitted.]”[13]
Fr. Harrison’s discussion is enough to show that the traditional Catholic doctrine was potentially a matter of great subtlety. The traditional doctrine was, Fr. Harrison maintains, “obscure and undecided” in part, and thus open to clarification by the council fathers. But even more questions occur upon these assertions. If the council fathers clarified the traditional Catholic doctrine, how did they leave it “untouched”? Further, how could any clarification not also remain obscure and undecided when the council fathers did not specify the part of traditional doctrine they were addressing?
As the experience of Davis and Guminski show, an educated Catholic layperson would have difficulty treating religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine as separate subject matters without engaging in an artificial compartmentalization of thought. The connection of the two concepts remains natural for such a person because Church teaching correlates human freedom with responsibility to other humans and to God.[14]
So far at least, the document does not explain clearly how religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine are separate. It is therefore difficult to see how development of the latter would leave the former untouched.
“Over and above all this, the council intends to develop the doctrine of recent popes on the inviolable rights of the human person and the constitutional order of society.”
“[T]his” in the opening phrase most likely refers to the “traditional Catholic doctrine” mentioned in the prior sentence. The council fathers next refer to “the doctrine of recent popes,” who are not identified. The doctrine of these popes is specified as teaching on “the inviolable rights of the human person and the constitutional order of society,” which, judging from the document thus far, is another way of saying “religious freedom.”
As already noted, one way to distinguish religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine is to treat them as separate subject matters. That is difficult to do, as just explained. The chronological reference in the present sentence to “recent popes” suggests another approach.
If religious freedom and the traditional Catholic doctrine are not separate matters but only chronologically sequenced, then the council fathers could develop one while leaving the other untouched. The council fathers would simply reference the “traditional” and then move on to the “recent.” There surprisingly is some support for this reading in the document’s text.
Most obviously, a chronological reading would explain the council fathers’ failure to specify the content of the traditional Catholic doctrine. If they intended to leave it in the past, the traditional doctrine would be irrelevant to the doctrine of the “recent popes” the fathers did intend to develop. Such a reading would also fit the document’s emphasis on contemporary events generally.
A chronological reading, however, suggests a change in Church doctrine, or indeed that the change had already occurred between the traditional Catholic doctrine (whatever that was) and the recent popes (whoever they were). But educated Catholic laity take Church doctrine to be true diachronically and not just synchronically.[15] The council fathers, moreover, promised to search “the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church” and bring forth “new things that in harmony with the things that are old. [Emphasis added.]” They also said, “all men are bound to seek the truth” and “to hold fast to it. [Emphasis added.]” Read as a whole, article 1 does not say the truth can change with the times, much less that the council fathers intended to make a change. The chronological reading is therefore not plausible.
Lastly, there is the infinitive phrase, “to develop.” Could this explain how the council fathers’ teaching relates to the traditional Catholic doctrine and/or the doctrine of the recent popes? An educated Catholic layperson would read the phrase to mean that the council fathers intended to explicate their teaching based on what had come before.[16] The phrase would not support a change in the teaching, and if such an expectation had existed in the reader, it would be undone by language earlier in article 1, as just explained.
Conclusion to article 1.
Article 1 is a confusing muddle. It is clear the council fathers thought times were changing, that “contemporary man” demanded religious freedom, and that they could address the demand theologically. The conceptual framework for such a project remains unclear, however.
[1] Merriam-Webster, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cf.
[2] Retrieved on August 10, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; see also http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf, page 279.
[3] Retrieved on August 10, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; see also http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf, page 265.
[4] Retrieved on August 10, 2020, from: https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=3461; see also http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-37-1945-ocr.pdf, page 14.
[5]Retrieved on August 11, 2020, from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subsist.
[6] Retrieved on August 8, 2020, from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nations.
[7] ” Conscience is a judgment of reason whereby the human person recognizes the moral quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the process of performing, or has already completed.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶1778, retrieved on September 8, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P5Z.HTM#2D.
[8]“An upright and true moral conscience is formed by education and by assimilating the Word of God and the teaching of the Church. It is supported by the gifts of the Holy Spirit and helped by the advice of wise people. Prayer and an examination of conscience can also greatly assist one’s moral formation.” “A person must always obey the certain judgment of his own conscience but he could make erroneous judgments for reasons that may not always exempt him from personal guilt. However, an evil act committed through involuntary ignorance is not imputable to the person, even though the act remains objectively evil. One must therefore work to correct the errors of moral conscience.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005, ¶¶ 374, 376. Retrieved on September 8, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[9] Retrieved on August 12, 2020, from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conscience.
[10] Davies, Michael, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, The Newmann Press, Long Prairie, Minnesota, 1992.
[11] Davies, p. 227.
[12] Guminski, Arnold T., “Contra Harrison in Re Libertatis Religiosae: On the Meaning of Dignitatis Humanae,” Faith & Reason, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Spring 2001, 39–83.
[13] Harrison, Brian W. O.S., “What does Dignitatis Humanae Mean? A Reply to Arnold Guminski,” Faith & Reason, Vol. XXX, Nos. 3-4, Autumn & Winter 2005, 243-295.
[14] “Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the mastery of the will over its acts.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶ 1734, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994. Retrieved on August 19, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5N.HTM
[15] “The Church’s social teaching comprises a body of doctrine, which is articulated as the Church interprets events in the course of history, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in the light of the whole of what has been revealed by Jesus Christ. This teaching can be more easily accepted by men of good will, the more the faithful let themselves be guided by it.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶ 2422. Retrieved on August 21, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P8C.HTM.
[16] “The social doctrine of the Church is an organic development of the truth of the Gospel about the dignity of the human person and his social dimension offering principles for reflection, criteria for judgment, and norms and guidelines for action.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶509, retrieved on November 26, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html; “develop . . . 1a: to set forth or make clear by degrees or in detail : EXPOUND . . .develop a thesis, b: to make visible or manifest. . . 2a: to work out the possibilities of, develop an idea, b: to create or produce especially by deliberate effort over time . . . 3a: to make active or promote the growth of . . . b(1): to make available or usable . . . 4a: to cause to evolve or unfold gradually : to lead or conduct (something) through a succession of states or changes each of which is preparatory for the next . . .b: to expand by a process of growth,” Merriam-Webster, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/develop; “The social doctrine of the Church is an organic development of the truth of the Gospel about the dignity of the human person and his social dimension offering principles for reflection, criteria for judgment, and norms and guidelines for action.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶509, retrieved on November 26, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.