Article 2
“This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom.”
The council fathers began Article 1 by asserting that “contemporary man” desired religious freedom. The council fathers now begin Article 2 by asserting the existence of such a right. The fathers supported their assertion in article 1 by appealing to their own authority: “This Vatican Council takes careful note of these desires in the minds of men.” Here the fathers likewise appeal to their own authority, but an educated Catholic layperson would see in the present sentence not the authority of a mere witness to contemporary facts, as in the sentence quoted from article 1, but the teaching authority of bishops over the Faith itself.[1]
“This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.”
The Latin original runs as follows: “Huiusmodi libertas in eo consistit, quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cuiusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur, quominus iuxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra debitos limites [emphasis added].”[2]
A comparison of the English and Latin sentences shows the first version does not explicitly translate the bolded phrases of the second. [I]n re religiosa can be translated “in religious matters.” [N]eque impediatur can be translated “nor prevented.”
Explicitly translating the omitted Latin, and rendering “conscientiam” as the more natural “conscience,” the teaching of the council fathers was: 1) In religious matters, 2) no one is to be forced to act contrary to his or her conscience, 3) nor prevented from acting according to his or her conscience, 4) whether privately or publicly, 5) whether alone or in association with others, 6) within due limits. Each is considered in turn.
1) In religious matters.
Since the council fathers specifically disapprove of coercion in religious matters, an educated Catholic layperson would think it important to define the adjective “religious” and/or the underlying noun, “religion.” Such a person would think so on the belief that coercion is a necessary part of statecraft and cannot be rejected entirely.[3]
Unfortunately, the council fathers never define “religious” or “religion,” leaving uncertainty regarding their meaning. The problem plagues the rest of the document.
A few observations nevertheless may be made to inform the discussion. When “religion” first appeared in the document, in article 1, it was as an abstract noun: “It [the demand for freedom] regards . . . the free exercise of religion in society.” Of the 15 instances of “religion” in the document, most follow this use; they do not refer to a specific religion or religions, but the category of religion. It is here especially that confusion arises, because the fathers do not specify what they intend to include in the category. The confusion spills over to their use of the adjective “religious,” which in practice is just as abstract. In the phrase at issue here, for example, what is included in “religious matters [emphasis added]”? The document does not say.
The document also uses “religion” a concrete noun, similarly seen first in article 1: “We believe that the one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church . . . .” Whenever “religion” is used as a concrete noun, it evidently means one specific religion or a plurality of specific religions.
The last two sentences of article 6 give examples of these usages:
” It follows that a wrong is done when government imposes upon its people, by force or fear or other means, the profession or repudiation of any religion [singular concrete noun], or when it hinders men from joining or leaving a religious community. All the more is it a violation of the will of God and of the sacred rights of the person and the family of nations when force is brought to bear in any way in order to destroy or repress religion [abstract noun], either in the whole of mankind or in a particular country or in a definite community.”
The fact the council fathers use “religion” as a concrete noun meaning either a specific religion or a plurality of them suggests the use of the word as an abstract noun or adjective is potentially just as inclusive. However, when one carefully examines the council father’s use of “religion” as an abstract noun or adjective, one finds it could be read as Catholicism alone!
In article 1, for example, after seeming to reject coercion absolutely, the council fathers narrowed their meaning by stating: “Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society.” So, there is a connection between the “duty to worship God” and “immunity from coercion”; one could perhaps the first supports the second. However, considering the fathers had just defined Catholic beliefs regarding the nature of God and his Church, an educated Catholic layperson could take their repetition of the word “God” in the quoted sentence to mean the personal, good, omniscient, and omnipotent God of the Catholic faith. And, of course, the duty to worship such a God would include joining the Catholic religion and following its precepts. Did the council fathers therefore mean to limit immunity from coercion to Catholics alone? It seems unlikely given the tone of the document, but numerous examples of such possible readings will be shown in the following analysis.
One can only say that if the council fathers intended religious freedom for Catholics alone, they did not make their meaning plain. The language in places is broad, and an educated Catholic layperson would certainly know the great diversity of religious beliefs and practices throughout the world, including idol worship and atheism.[4] Indeed, this forces another question: Did the council fathers include such things in the category of “religion” such that idol worshipers, atheists, or even Satanists have religious freedom? The document, unfortunately, will never clearly answer this question.
2) no one is forced to act contrary to his or her conscience.
This teaching would be readily understood by the educated Catholic laity.
3) nor prevented from acting according to his or her conscience.
The distinction between this provision and the prior one is potentially very fine, perhaps justifying its omission in the English version. Depending on perspective, the same coercion could be seem as either forcing action or preventing action. If someone were prohibited from fasting, for example, it could be construed as forcing action (the action being eating) or preventing action (the action being fasting). The Latin simply covers both interpretations.
4) whether privately or publicly.
This teaching would be readily understood.
5) whether alone or in association with others.
This teaching would be readily understood.
6) within due limits.
The council fathers again narrow their initial, seemingly broad, rejection of coercion. Not only do they mean religious coercion, but even within that field, coercion is proper once due limits are passed. A challenge for the rest of the document is to decipher what limits the fathers thought were due.
“This council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.(2)”
The council fathers continue their move from the political categories of article 1, the “sense” and “demand” of “contemporary man,” to metaphysical categories, specifically revelation and reason. The key remains, however, human dignity. The council fathers also provide their second footnote.
The fathers again cite Pacem in Terris from Pope John XXIII, along with another radio message of Pope Pius XII, this one from Christmas 1942. They add Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge, and Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum.
The pages cited from Pacem in Terris state:
“Also among man’s rights is that of being able to worship God in accordance with the right dictates of his own conscience, and to profess his religion both in private and in public. According to the clear teaching of Lactantius, “this is the very condition of our birth, that we render to the God who made us that just homage which is His due; that we acknowledge Him alone as God, and follow Him. It is from this ligature of piety, which binds us and joins us to God, that religion derives its name.”
Hence, too, Pope Leo XIII declared that “true freedom, freedom worthy of the sons of God, is that freedom which most truly safeguards the dignity of the human person. It is stronger than any violence or injustice. Such is the freedom which has always been desired by the Church, and which she holds most dear. It is the sort of freedom which the Apostles resolutely claimed for themselves. The apologists defended it in their writings; thousands of martyrs consecrated it with their blood. [Internal footnotes omitted.]”[5]
The first sentence quoted from Pacem in Terris does seem to support the sentences just quoted from Dignitatis humanae. Pope John XXIII refers to a person’s right worship God according to “right dictates of his own conscience,” and also a right to “profess his religion both in private and in public.” Rhetorically, however, uncertainty about the “religion” in question remains a problem. Although the impression is quite broad, the pope specifies worshiping “God” and acting according to the “right dictates” of conscience, which could perhaps exclude false, i.e., non-Catholic, worship.
Turning now to Pope Pius XII’s radio message, it similarly does not specify the religion in question and could be read to mean Catholicism alone:
“He who would have the star of peace to shine permanently over society must do all in his power to restore to the human person the dignity which God conferred upon him from the beginning; he must resist the excessive herding together of human beings, as though they were a soulless mass; he must set his face against their disintegration in economic, social, political, intellectual, and moral life; against their lack of solid principles and firm convictions; against their excessive reliance upon instinct and emotion, and against their fickleness of mood; he must favor, by all legitimate means and in every sphere of life, social forms which render possible and guarantee full personal responsibility in regard to things both temporal and spiritual.
He must foster the observance and practical implementing of the following fundamental rights of the person: the right to maintain and develop physical, intellectual. and moral life, and in particular the right to a religious training and education; the right to worship God, both in private and in public, including the right to engage in religious works of charity; the right, in principle, to marriage and to the attainment of the purpose of marriage, the right to wedded society and home life; the right to work as an indispensable means for the maintenance of family life; the right to the free choice of a state of life, and therefore of the priestly and religious state; the right to a use of material goods, subject to its duties and to its social limitations.”[6]
The page cited from Mit Brennender Sorge has a single sentence relevant to religious freedom. It is again unclear in its application. Although the language sounds broad, it does not specify the “believer” or the “Faith” in question: “The believer has an absolute right to profess his Faith and live according to its dictates. Laws which impede this profession and practice of Faith are against natural law.”[7]
This quote does add one new element, a reference to “natural law.” Natural law is a familiar concept to the educated Catholic laity.[8] Since natural law is reason’s participation in the eternal law of God, it might appear to an educated Catholic layperson that only restrictionS on the profession and practice of the true Faith would violate such a law. Thus when reading, “[l]aws which impede this profession and practice of Faith are against natural law,” an educated Catholic layperson might read the “Faith” in question (the word is, it should be noted, capitalized in the source) as “Catholicism.” On this reading, only aCatholic would have an absolute right to profess his or her Faith and live according to its dictates.
Finally, the quote from Libertas Praestantissimum supports this restrictive reading of Mit Brennender Sorge. Pope Leo XII, in the page cited by the council fathers, links liberty of conscience to the truth, strongly suggesting that the freedom at issue is that of the Catholic Church:
“Another liberty is widely advocated, namely, liberty of conscience. If by this is meant that everyone may, as he chooses, worship God or not, it is sufficiently refuted by the arguments already adduced. But it may also be taken to mean that every man in the State may follow the will of God and, from a consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle, obey His commands. This, indeed, is true liberty, a liberty worthy of the sons of God, which nobly maintains the dignity of man and is stronger than all violence or wrong – a liberty which the Church has always desired and held most dear.”[9]
Pope Leo XIII mentions here and incorporates by reference his earlier arguments against the view that “everyone may, as he chooses, worship God or not.” To understand the grounds to reject such a view, and therefore to understand the teaching of Leo XIII cited by the council fathers, it is necessary to set out additional passages from Libertas Praestantissimum. Since Leo XIII develops his arguments carefully, the quotes must be somewhat extensive.
Leo XIII first praises liberty and ties it to human dignity: “Liberty, the highest of natural endowments, being the portion only of intellectual or rational natures, confers on man this dignity – that he is ‘in the hand of his counsel’ and has power over his actions. [Internal footnote omitted.]” The pope then indicates the consequences of this dignity: ” But the manner in which such dignity is exercised is of the greatest moment, inasmuch as on the use that is made of liberty the highest good and the greatest evil alike depend.” Specifically, “[m]an, indeed, is free to obey his reason, to seek moral good, and to strive unswervingly after his last end. Yet he is free also to turn aside to all other things; and, in pursuing the empty semblance of good, to disturb rightful order and to fall headlong into the destruction which he has voluntarily chosen.”[10]
After discussing the origin of reason in God, Pope Leo XIII draws the natural inference both for those who rule and those who are ruled:
“From this it is manifest that the eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not only in each individual man, but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when united. Therefore, the true liberty of human society does not consist in every man doing what he pleases, for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion, and bring on the overthrow of the State; but rather in this, that through the injunctions of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions of the eternal law. Likewise, the liberty of those who are in authority does not consist in the power to lay unreasonable and capricious commands upon their subjects, which would equally be criminal and would lead to the ruin of the commonwealth; but the binding force of human laws is in this, that they are to be regarded as applications of the eternal law, and incapable of sanctioning anything which is not contained in the eternal law, as in the principle of all law. Thus, St. Augustine most wisely says: “I think that you can see, at the same time, that there is nothing just and lawful in that temporal law, unless what men have gathered from this eternal law.” If, then, by anyone in authority, something be sanctioned out of conformity with the principles of right reason, and consequently hurtful to the commonwealth, such an enactment can have no binding force of law, as being no rule of justice, but certain to lead men away from that good which is the very end of civil society. [Internal footnote omitted.]”[11]
Pope Leo XIII emphasized this twin nature of liberty, showing that the same divine authority which commands respect for just laws also restrains the obedience owed to unjust laws:
“Moreover, the highest duty is to respect authority, and obediently to submit to just law; and by this the members of a community are effectually protected from the wrong-doing of evil men. Lawful power is from God, “and whosoever resisteth authority resisteth the ordinance of God’ ;(6) wherefore, obedience is greatly ennobled when subjected to an authority which is the most just and supreme of all. But where the power to command is wanting, or where a law is enacted contrary to reason, or to the eternal law, or to some ordinance of God, obedience is unlawful, lest, while obeying man, we become disobedient to God. Thus, an effectual barrier being opposed to tyranny, the authority in the State will not have all its own way, but the interests and rights of all will be safeguarded – the rights of individuals, of domestic society, and of all the members of the commonwealth; all being free to live according to law and right reason; and in this, as We have shown, true liberty really consists.
If when men discuss the question of liberty they were careful to grasp its true and legitimate meaning, such as reason and reasoning have just explained, they would never venture to affix such a calumny on the Church as to assert that she is the foe of individual and public liberty. But many there are who follow in the footsteps of Lucifer, and adopt as their own his rebellious cry, “I will not serve”; and consequently substitute for true liberty what is sheer and most foolish license. Such, for instance, are the men belonging to that widely spread and powerful organization, who, usurping the name of liberty, style themselves liberals.”[12]
Leo XIII’s teaching is thus that false liberty—every person doing as he or she pleases— ends in tyranny because the same standard applies to rulers, leaving power as the determining factor. The powerful get their way, and the rest, with no appeal to the eternal law (already rejected as the standard for liberty) live in servitude:
“Moreover, besides this, a doctrine of such character is most hurtful both to individuals and to the State. For, once ascribe to human reason the only authority to decide what is true and what is good, and the real distinction between good and evil is destroyed; honor and dishonor differ not in their nature, but in the opinion and judgment of each one; pleasure is the measure of what is lawful; and, given a code of morality which can have little or no power to restrain or quiet the unruly propensities of man, a way is naturally opened to universal corruption. With reference also to public affairs: authority is severed from the true and natural principle whence it derives all its efficacy for the common good; and the law determining what it is right to do and avoid doing is at the mercy of a majority. Now, this is simply a road leading straight to tyranny. The empire of God over man and civil society once repudiated, it follows that religion, as a public institution, can have no claim to exist, and that everything that belongs to religion will be treated with complete indifference. Furthermore, with ambitious designs on sovereignty, tumult and sedition will be common amongst the people; and when duty and conscience cease to appeal to them, there will be nothing to hold them back but force, which of itself alone is powerless to keep their covetousness in check. Of this we have almost daily evidence in the conflict with socialists and members of other seditious societies, who labor unceasingly to bring about revolution. It is for those, then, who are capable of forming a just estimate of things to decide whether such doctrines promote that true liberty which alone is worthy of man, or rather, pervert and destroy it.”[13]
After remarks concerning the various degrees of modern liberal thought, Pope XIII addressed religious freedom specifically:
“To make this more evident, the growth of liberty ascribed to our age must be considered apart in its various details. And, first, let us examine that liberty in individuals which is so opposed to the virtue of religion, namely, the liberty of worship, as it is called. This is based on the principle that every man is free to profess as he may choose any religion or none.
But, assuredly, of all the duties which man has to fulfill, that, without doubt, is the chiefest and holiest which commands him to worship God with devotion and piety. This follows of necessity from the truth that we are ever in the power of God, are ever guided by His will and providence, and, having come forth from Him, must return to Him. Add to which, no true virtue can exist without religion, for moral virtue is concerned with those things which lead to God as man’s supreme and ultimate good; and therefore religion, which (as St. Thomas says) “performs those actions which are directly and immediately ordained for the divine honor”, rules and tempers all virtues. And if it be asked which of the many conflicting religions it is necessary to adopt, reason and the natural law unhesitatingly tell us to practice that one which God enjoins, and which men can easily recognize by certain exterior notes, whereby Divine Providence has willed that it should be distinguished, because, in a matter of such moment, the most terrible loss would be the consequence of error. Wherefore, when a liberty such as We have described is offered to man, the power is given him to pervert or abandon with impunity the most sacred of duties, and to exchange the unchangeable good for evil; which, as We have said, is no liberty, but its degradation, and the abject submission of the soul to sin. [Internal footnote omitted.]”[14]
Pope Leo XIII next applied this understanding to the governance of the state:
“This kind of liberty, if considered in relation to the State, clearly implies that there is no reason why the State should offer any homage to God, or should desire any public recognition of Him; that no one form of worship is to be preferred to another, but that all stand on an equal footing, no account being taken of the religion of the people, even if they profess the Catholic faith. But, to justify this, it must needs be taken as true that the State has no duties toward God, or that such duties, if they exist, can be abandoned with impunity, both of which assertions are manifestly false. For it cannot be doubted but that, by the will of God, men are united in civil society; whether its component parts be considered; or its form, which implies authority; or the object of its existence; or the abundance of the vast services which it renders to man. God it is who has made man for society, and has placed him in the company of others like himself, so that what was wanting to his nature, and beyond his attainment if left to his own resources, he might obtain by association with others. Wherefore, civil society must acknowledge God as its Founder and Parent, and must obey and reverence His power and authority. Justice therefore forbids, and reason itself forbids, the State to be godless; or to adopt a line of action which would end in godlessness-namely, to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges. Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary in the State, that religion must be professed which alone is true, and which can be recognized without difficulty, especially in Catholic States, because the marks of truth are, as it were, engravers upon it. This religion, therefore, the rulers of the State must preserve and protect, if they would provide – as they should do – with prudence and usefulness for the good of the community. For public authority exists for the welfare of those whom it governs; and, although its proximate end is to lead men to the prosperity found in this life, yet, in so doing, it ought not to diminish, but rather to increase, man’s capability of attaining to the supreme good in which his everlasting happiness consists: which never can be attained if religion be disregarded.”[15]
After addressing other sorts of liberty, such as liberty of speech and teaching, Leo XIII reaches the passage on liberty of conscience cited by the council fathers in Dignitatis humanae. It is quoted again here with material both before and after to show its context:
“From all this may be understood the nature and character of that liberty which the followers of liberalism so eagerly advocate and proclaim. On the one hand, they demand for themselves and for the State a license which opens the way to every perversity of opinion; and on the other, they hamper the Church in divers ways, restricting her liberty within narrowest limits, although from her teaching not only is there nothing to be feared, but in every respect very much to be gained.
Another liberty is widely advocated, namely, liberty of conscience. If by this is meant that everyone may, as he chooses, worship God or not, it is sufficiently refuted by the arguments already adduced. But it may also be taken to mean that every man in the State may follow the will of God and, from a consciousness of duty and free from every obstacle, obey His commands. This, indeed, is true liberty, a liberty worthy of the sons of God, which nobly maintains the dignity of man and is stronger than all violence or wrong – a liberty which the Church has always desired and held most dear. This is the kind of liberty the Apostles claimed for themselves with intrepid constancy, which the apologists of Christianity confirmed by their writings, and which the martyrs in vast numbers consecrated by their blood. And deservedly so; for this Christian liberty bears witness to the absolute and most just dominion of God over man, and to the chief and supreme duty of man toward God. It has nothing in common with a seditious and rebellious mind; and in no title derogates from obedience to public authority; for the right to command and to require obedience exists only so far as it is in accordance with the authority of God, and is within the measure that He has laid down. But when anything is commanded which is plainly at variance with the will of God, there is a wide departure from this divinely constituted order, and at the same time a direct conflict with divine authority; therefore, it is right not to obey.”[16]
Pope Leo XIII concludes this portion of his discussion by repeating what is probably the central point of Libertas Praestantissimum, that modern liberalism tends toward slavish tyranny, not dignified freedom:
“By the patrons of liberalism, however, who make the State absolute and omnipotent, and proclaim that man should live altogether independently of God, the liberty of which We speak, which goes hand in hand with virtue and religion, is not admitted; and whatever is done for its preservation is accounted an injury and an offense against the State. Indeed, if what they say were really true, there would be no tyranny, no matter how monstrous, which we should not be bound to endure and submit to.”[17]
What should educated Catholic laypersons take from all this? Is religious persecution and intolerance generally thereby required? Pope Leo XIII gives this answer:
“Yet, with the discernment of a true mother, the Church weighs the great burden of human weakness, and well knows the course down which the minds and actions of men are in this our age being borne. For this reason, while not conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good. God Himself in His providence, though infinitely good and powerful, permits evil to exist in the world, partly that greater good may not be impeded, and partly that greater evil may not ensue. In the government of States it is not forbidden to imitate the Ruler of the world; and, as the authority of man is powerless to prevent every evil, it has (as St. Augustine says) to overlook and leave unpunished many things which are punished, and rightly, by Divine Providence. But if, in such circumstances, for the sake of the common good (and this is the only legitimate reason), human law may or even should tolerate evil, it may not and should not approve or desire evil for its own sake; for evil of itself, being a privation of good, is opposed to the common welfare which every legislator is bound to desire and defend to the best of his ability. In this, human law must endeavor to imitate God, who, as St. Thomas teaches, in allowing evil to exist in the world, “neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills only to permit it to be done; and this is good.” This saying of the Angelic Doctor contains briefly the whole doctrine of the permission of evil.
But, to judge aright, we must acknowledge that, the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further is it from perfection; and that the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare, requires. Wherefore, if such tolerance would be injurious to the public welfare, and entail greater evils on the State, it would not be lawful; for in such case the motive of good is wanting. And although in the extraordinary condition of these times the Church usually acquiesces in certain modern liberties, not because she prefers them in themselves, but because she judges it expedient to permit them, she would in happier times exercise her own liberty; and, by persuasion, exhortation, and entreaty would endeavor, as she is bound, to fulfill the duty assigned to her by God of providing for the eternal salvation of mankind. One thing, however, remains always true – that the liberty which is claimed for all to do all things is not, as We have often said, of itself desirable, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason that error and truth should have equal rights. [Internal footnotes omitted.]”[18]
“[I]t is contrary to reason that error and truth should have equal rights,” sums up Leo XIII’s teaching, with the exception of toleration when a greater evil may be avoided or a greater good gained. But let Leo conclude in his own words:
“And now to reduce for clearness’ sake to its principal heads all that has been set forth with its immediate conclusions, the summing up in this briefly: that man, by a necessity of his nature, is wholly subject to the most faithful and ever-enduring power of God; and that, as a consequence, any liberty, except that which consists in submission to God and in subjection to His will, is unintelligible. To deny the existence of this authority in God, or to refuse to submit to it, means to act, not as a free man, but as one who treasonably abuses his liberty; and in such a disposition of mind the chief and deadly vice of liberalism essentially consists.”[19]
Just as the broad language in article 1 of Dignitatis humanae is not consistent with the more restrained language of the sources cited in footnote 1, so the broad language in article 2 is not consistent with much more restrained sources in footnote 2. As already noted, the council fathers did preface footnotes 1 and 2 with a “Cf.“, an abbreviation meaning “compare,” leaving the reader unsure on the comparison.
What footnotes 1 and 2 add thus remains unclear. The reader has no guide to resolve the apparent disparity between the language in the text and the interpretation suggested by the sources in the footnotes. The problem appears insuperable because the key words in Dignitatis humanae, “dignity,” “freedom,” “liberty,” rights,” “conscience,” and “religion” are never clearly defined.
The document opened, of course, with a paean to “contemporary man,” implying that the demand of such people for religious freedom is precisely what the council fathers intended to discuss. But the document then moved to revealed Catholic theology, traditional Catholic teaching, the doctrine of recent popes, and finally, in footnote 2, to papal writings which are not nearly as liberal as the demands of “contemporary man.” That is, of course, unless “contemporary man” actually means contemporary Catholics, a seemingly absurd but still possible reading.
Moreover, since Libertas Praestantissimum especially is not liberal, is Leo XIII one of the recent popes whose doctrine the council fathers intended to develop, or is he an expounder of the traditional Catholic theology the council fathers intended to leave untouched? The jarring tension between Libertas Praestantissimum and the tone of Dignitatis humanae is never resolved.
“The right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil right.”
The council fathers have used the word “right” or “rights” five times in the document, all within the last five sentences. The present sentence is the first appearance of “civil right.” The fathers do not define what they mean by either a “right” or a “civil right,” however.
Lacking definitions, the reader must consider the words in context. Setting out the usage from the prior sentences, the council fathers first spoke of “the inviolable rights of the human person,” next that “the human person has a right to religious freedom,” and similarly that “the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person.” The first usage in the present sentence, “[t]he right of the human person to religious freedom,” is nearly identical to the second and third examples just listed.
Turning now to the last clause of the present sentence, “it is to become a civil right,” the pronoun subject “it” has as its antecedent the subject of the first clause, “[t]he right of the human person to religious freedom.” Put together, this would read: “the right of the human person to religious freedom is to become a civil right.”
An educated Catholic layperson would read the construction to mean a “civil right” is somehow distinguishable from “right” generally, i.e., “religious freedom” is a “right” of another sort before it becomes (if it ever does) a “civil right.” This grammatical rendering is supported by the fact that the council fathers had earlier referred to “inviolable rights.” An educated Catholic layperson would read “civil right” to mean a right “in the legal order of society.”[20] “Inviolable rights,” however, are understood to be “‘inherent in the human person and in human dignity’ [internal footnote omitted.]”[21] Hence an educated Catholic layperson would not conclude the council fathers were discussing here only those rights actually protected by human law, but also those rights human persons hold by their very nature. Compare this with the previous sentence of Dignitatis humanae, where the council fathers said, “the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person.” Logically, then, the “inviolable rights” discussed by the council fathers, including the right to religious freedom, appear to mean natural rights.
The council fathers therefore appear to have taught: 1) human persons have natural rights, 2) these include a right to religious freedom, and 3) religious freedom should be protected by human law.
An educated Catholic layperson would not be confused by the notion that natural rights should be protected by human law. But such a layperson could be confused by the notion that natural rights include religious freedom, if such freedom includes a right to idolatry, blasphemy, sacrilege, heresy, and other rejections of God. A layperson would know that nature itself comes from God.[22] Thus, as the council fathers made clear in article 1, humans by nature should adore and serve the one, true God.[23] It would seem unlikely that a natural right to religious freedom could include a right to reject God, as Pope Leo XIII explained in Libertas Praestantissimum, a document the council fathers also cited. God would be made the author of evil in that hypothesis, which is blasphemous.
So what could the council fathers mean by a”right” to religious freedom? Did they mean a right to the Catholic faith only? Since the terms are not formally defined, including “right” and “religion,” it impossible to pin them down.
“It is in accordance with their dignity as persons—that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth.”
This sentence was quoted earlier to explain the basis for human dignity. Here, it confirms the points just made. The council fathers seem to be saying that humans conform to their nature when they seek the truth, “especially religious truth.”
“They are also bound to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.”
The same comments apply here.
“However, men cannot discharge these obligations in a manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psychological freedom.”
The “[h]owever” is obviously significant. The antecedents for “these obligations” are found in the prior two sentences: “to seek the truth, especially religious truth,” and “to adhere to the truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.” These obligations cannot be fulfilled without “psychological freedom,” which an educated Catholic layperson would take to mean free will.[24]
This sentence is the first direct treatment of the social nature of the human person. The council fathers have referred to that social nature before, mentioning “government,” “associations,” “society,” “societies,” and “social groups.” But the fathers’ exposition has focused on the human person and his or her characteristics, with mention of groups then following: “traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ,” “whether alone or in association with others,” etc. [Emphasis added.]
With this sentence, however, the council fathers relate the individual to the community in a fundamental way. Now, the council fathers say, the individual’s own functioning depends in some way on the community. Indeed, a person’s nature requires a certain arrangement within society.
In the fathers’ description, the requisite arrangement is purely legal and negative—”immunity from external coercion.” The council fathers seem to say that human nature, which is obliged to seek and hold fast to the truth, “especially religious truth,” is fulfilled by a legal framework of governmental forbearance. Only then can humans properly “discharge” their “obligations” to the truth.
This invites a thought experiment. Say a person in a certain society did not enjoy immunity from external coercion in matters of religious truth. Assume further that the society coerced in favor of Catholicism, like the ideal described by Pope Leo XIII in Libertas Praestantissimum. Examples could include, an educated Catholic layperson would know, the Catholic states of Europe during the Middle Ages.
Say the person was then transported into a society where he or she enjoyed immunity from external coercion in matters of religious truth. What, according to the council fathers, would happen? The present sentence, when considered together with the preceding two, says the person could for the first time properly “seek the truth, especially religious truth,” and “adhere to the truth, once it is known, and . . . order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.”
Did the council fathers really mean this? Did they mean Catholics living in societies which coerced in favor of Catholicism did not properly seek the truth, adhere to it when found, or order their whole lives in accord with it? If so, then Catholicism is frustrated by coercion in favor of the truth. But an educated Catholic layperson knows his or her religion can overcome even coercion against the truth,[25] which leaves some uncertainty about how coercion in favor of the truth is so damaging.
As a possible caveat to this reading, the phrase “in a manner in keeping with their own nature” may be a qualifier to “discharge” rather than a prerequisite to it. In other words, the council fathers might have meant that while Catholics living in societies which coerce in favor of Catholicism can seek and live religious truth, they do so slavishly and not in keeping with their own nature. This reading is consistent with the documents’ general disapproval of coercion, which might have had a pejorative meaning for the council fathers unknown to the educated Catholic laity (at least those who speak English).
But it is again impossible to know exactly what the fathers meant. “Coercion” is among the many undefined words. The reader is thus left with the impression that doing the right thing is fully human only when it is not required. The sentiment is unintelligible to the educated Catholic laity, who understand virtue is comprised precisely of acts taken in accordance with law.[26]
Therefore, an educated Catholic layperson must return once again to a question about the true scope of Dignitiatis humanae. Despite its references to other religions when “religion” is used as a plural concrete noun, is Catholicism the only religion actually meant when “religion” is used as an abstract noun or adjective? Is it a tacit assertion that Catholicism alone fits the definition? Did the council fathers mean to say here, for example, that people cannot discharge their obligations to practice Catholicism in a manner in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy immunity from external coercion against Catholicism, as well as psychological freedom? As improbable as the reading seems from the tone of the document, this is a possible.
“Therefore the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature.”
This is the clearest statement by the council fathers that religious freedom is a natural right. But how could God create not just the ability to reject Him, which an educated Catholic layperson knows is consistent with the good,[27] but a right to do so? Such a person would understand that one does not sin by exercising a right,[28] and that one does sin by rejecting God.[29] A right to reject God would therefore be illogical; one could not both not sin and sin in the same action, at least under the principle of non-contradiction.
It seems, therefore, that the council fathers were operating either from an unexpected meaning of “right” or an unexpected meaning of “religious freedom.” Either a “right” for them included intentional evil, or “religious” refers to Catholicism alone. Neither reading fits the rest of the document, so the result is confusion.
“In consequence, the right to this immunity continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that just public order be observed.”
The sentence is a run-on, which complicates the analysis. It seems to anchor the right to immunity in something other than good will and practice. The right is apparently intrinsic, cannot be lost no matter ill will nor practice, and finds its limit only in the need for public order.
How might an educated Catholic layperson read this? Such a person would believe natural rights are inalienable and cannot be forfeited.[30] Civil rights, on the other hand, are legal and can be forfeited.[31] An educated Catholic layperson would therefore understand that while a person cannot forfeit a natural right upon abuse of it, say the right to liberty, the attendant civil right can be forfeited upon such an abuse. Depriving a person of his or her civil right to liberty by imprisonment on proof of theft would be an example.
But this is not what the present sentence says. The present sentence does not say the civil right of religious freedom may be forfeited upon abuse of the natural right to religious freedom. The present sentence says the civil right of religious freedom may be forfeited upon “the exercise of this right [emphasis added],” and grammatically “this right” refers to “the right to this immunity,” which in the prior sentences of article 2 was identified as the natural right in question. The natural right to religious freedom can be abused by its exercise, the council fathers seem to say, whenever its exercise threatens the just public order.
The question is then obvious: How could the exercise of a natural right threaten the just public order? Based on his or her understanding of the Faith, an educated Catholic layperson would have to answer: It could not.
Both human persons and society are natural, meaning created by God. Natural rights and the social order are therefore complimentary in essence, not potentially in conflict.[32] An educated Catholic layperson thus would not understand how a natural right could harm society.[33] If one were to say, for example, that exercising the right to life, or to education, or to health care, could harm society, an educated Catholic layperson would think the claim absurd. [34]
The matter may be clarified by examining how a right is abused. An educated Catholic layperson would think an abuse occurs when a person choses contrary to the right.[35] So, for example, a person harvests organs from prisoners to extend his or her own life. The killer has a right to life, of course, but killing others to protect one’s own life is contrary to the right in question. The right is, after all, a human right, not a right solely possessed by the killer.[36] Thus the killer is not exercising the right to life at all. The killer is choosing contrary to that right by selfishly appropriating it, and so the choice is an abuse of the natural right the killer still undoubtedly holds. The killer’s attendant civil right to life may thereby be forfeit if the violation is judged sufficiently grave.[37]
Other examples are possible. Suicide, for example, is also a choice contrary to the right to life, although it does not necessarily deprive others of the same right. The point is that, whatever the specific analysis, an educated Catholic layperson would consider abuse of a natural right to involve a choice contrary to that right.
Turning again to the present question, how could a person choose contrary to immunity from coercion with respect to religion? The answer is obvious—by coercing in religion. That particular line need not be followed, however, because once again the council fathers did not set the abuse of the right to immunity from coercion against the just public order, they set its exercise against the just public order: “the exercise of this right is not to be impeded, provided that just public order be observed.”
In the minds of the council fathers, then, immunity can be taken too far. The council fathers do not justify the limit they chose, however. They merely asserted the just public order as a limit, which does little to explain their teaching.
An educated Catholic layperson could perhaps attempt to understand this teaching by applying it to the specification of religious liberty the council fathers set out in the first two sentences of article 2. Their teaching, to repeat, is that: 1) In religious matters, 2) no one is to be forced to act contrary to his or her conscience, 3) nor prevented from acting according to his or her conscience, 4) whether privately or publicly, 5) whether alone or in association with others, 6) within due limits.
1) In religious matters.
The extreme vagueness of this language has already been discussed.
2) no one is to be forced to act contrary to his or her conscience.
The question here is whether the exercise of the immunity against being forced to act in a manner contrary to conscience could threaten the just public order. If so, then the immunity could be taken too far. Given the lack of conceptual development in Dignitatis humanae, the analysis is perhaps furthered by examples.
Assume first a religiously indifferent agnostic living in a religiously fundamentalistic nation. The authorities order that all residents must join prayers or face penalties. The agnostic refuses because it would violate his or her conscience. The agnostic does not worry about religion much, but praying in any form would violate his or her creed of indifference.
The agnostic had a Catholic roommate at university, and the roommate kept a copy of Dignitatis humanae on the shelf. The agnostic had read the document in his or her spare time. Now, lacking better authority, the agnostic invokes the document and claims immunity against coercion.
The authorities read the document and call the agnostic in. They explain, with convincing evidence, that allowing anyone to avoid prayers without penalty would cause riots and numerous deaths. The only way to keep the peace, the authorities maintain, is for the agnostic either to participate in prayers or to incur penalties for refusing.
Is the agnostic at fault for disregarding religion? Yes, but the council fathers have already specified that the agnostic’s failure to live up to the obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it does not remove his or her immunity from coercion. So it appears the agnostic properly invoked Dignitatis humanae.
And yet the immunity, if exercised, would clearly undo the public order. Is the agnostic exercising too much immunity, in the view of the council fathers? After all, the agnostic’s claim of immunity will genuinely trigger violence. Is this an example of immunity taken too far? Dignitatis humanae does not clarify the point.
Now, it is true the council fathers specified the “just public order [emphasis added]” as the standard, but that does not solve the dilemma. Is a public order just which maintains the peace at the cost of individual conscience? Probably not, an educated Catholic layperson would think. Is an order just which devolves into violent turmoil whenever it protects individual conscience? Probably not, an educated Catholic layperson would think. But then does Dignitatis humanae only apply to public orders which are already just? And if so, what would that look like? The answer cannot be a public order which grants immunity so long as the just public order is observed, because the answer would beg the question.
Assume again that a religious fundamentalist in a modern, liberal state refuses to authorize a blood transfusion for his or her gravely ill child. The parent sincerely believes that such an act is evil, and if the parent were to acquiesce in it, the act would clearly violate his or her conscience. Suppose further that the child is being treated in a Catholic hospital, which must decide whether to respect the parent’s conscience or cooperate with public authorities who, the hospital knows, will order the transfusion.
Does Dignitatus humanae provide guidance here? If the parent says, “you should not coerce me against my conscience,” is the parent claiming too much immunity? The present case does not involve mass physical violence, as the previous example, but the spiritual violence against an individual conscience is unmistakable. Would the transfusion thereby violate the just public order? If the answer is no, does not the answer assume a public order which holds some values in more regard than immunity from coercion? If so, what would that order look like, and why in particular is it just? The answers to these questions are similarly unclear.
In both situations, as already hinted, an educated Catholic layperson would be tempted simply to impose a Catholic worldview on the participants. The just public order suggests an objective standard, which would (for a Catholic) naturally be decided under Catholic teaching, not under the teachings of another religion or ideology. Although some educated Catholic laity might disagree with the present author, in the first example, the agnostic should not be coerced, and in the second, the fundamentalist should. Is that what the council fathers intended? Did they really intend, as has been asked before, to grant religious freedom solely on Catholic terms?
The point seems unlikely. The council fathers taught in article 1: “The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power.” They therefore reasoned, “that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force.” Conscience is king, the father’s seem to assert, not Catholicism.
But when it comes to the limit on the right of immunity, is conscience still king? Suddenly, without warning or explanation, the council fathers interpose an objective standard, the just public order, which remains in unexplained tension with the subjective tone of the document. Confusion on the part of the educated Catholic laity seems inevitable without a better conceptual development of the framework supporting the council fathers’ conclusion.
3) nor prevented from acting according to his or her conscience.
As already noted, this phrasing clarifies the extent of the right to immunity from coercion. Whether the act in question is contrary to the conscience, or required by the conscience, the same immunity applies. The uncertainty over the just public order remains in either case, however.
4) whether privately or publicly.
This language similarly clarifies the extent of the right. Public acts would obviously impinge on the public order more directly than private acts, but that does nothing to explain the parameters of the just public order.
5) whether alone or in association with others.
The same comments apply here.
6) within due limits.
A mere announcement that limits apply without specifying those limits. In context, the “due limits” would be the “just public order,” but that leaves the reader in uncertainty about the just public order, as explained above.
Conclusion to article 2
The right to religious freedom articulated in article 2 of Dignitatis humanae has a limit, but the limit, although it is apparently objective, is not specified. The right is described as immunity from coercion in matters of religion, but coercion is used now broadly, now narrowly, and religion is never defined. As in article 1, the footnoted sources for article 2 support a more restrictive reading of the document than some of the document’s language seemingly does. When the document’s language is considered closely, moreover, an educated Catholic layperson could conclude it makes most sense when read to grant religious freedom only under Catholic terms. That reading seems improbable, however, when the tone of the document is taken into consideration.
[1] “‘The college of bishops exercises power over the universal Church in a solemn manner in an ecumenical council. [Internal footnote omitted.]'” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶884; “Bishops, with priests as co-workers, have as their first task ‘to preach the Gospel of God to all men'” in keeping with the Lord’s command. They are ‘heralds of faith, who draw new disciples to Christ; they are authentic teachers’ of the apostolic faith ‘endowed with the authority of Christ. [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶888.
[2] Retrieved on August 21, 2020, from http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_lt.html.
[3] “In order to protect the common good, the lawful public authority must exercise the right and the duty to inflict punishments according to the seriousness of the crimes committed. The State has the twofold responsibility to discourage behaviour that is harmful to human rights and the fundamental norms of civil life, and to repair, through the penal system, the disorder created by criminal activity. [Internal footnote and italics omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶402, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004, reprint 2005. Retrieved on August 21, 2020, from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Inflicting%20punishment.
[4] “Every practice that reduces persons to nothing more than a means of profit enslaves man, leads to idolizing money, and contributes to the spread of atheism.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2424. Retrieved on August 21, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P8C.HTM.
[5] Retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 55 (1963), p. 260-261, retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf, pp. 261-262.
[6] Retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://catholictradition.org/Encyclicals/1942.htm; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 37 (1945), p. 19, retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-35-1943-ocr.pdf.
[7]Retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_14031937_mit-brennender-sorge.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 29 (1937) p. 160, retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-29-1937-ocr.pdf, page 160.
[8] “The natural law ‘is nothing other than the light of intellect infused within us by God. Thanks to this, we know what must be done and what must be avoided. This light or this law has been given by God to creation.’ It consists in the participation in his eternal law, which is identified with God himself. This law is called ‘natural’ because the reason that promulgates it is proper to human nature. It is universal, it extends to all people insofar as it is established by reason. In its principal precepts, the divine and natural law is presented in the Decalogue and indicates the primary and essential norms regulating moral life. Its central focus is the act of aspiring and submitting to God, the source and judge of everything that is good, and also the act of seeing others as equal to oneself. The natural law expresses the dignity of the person and lays the foundations of the person’s fundamental duties. [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶140.
[9] Retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html, ¶30; 8 Acta Leonis XIII, pp 237-238, retrieved on August 24, 2020, from: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nnc1.0036695904&view=1up&seq=244,
[10]Para. 1, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[11] Para. 10, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[12] Paras. 13-14, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[13] Para. 16, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[14] Paras. 19-20, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[15] Para. 21, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[16] Paras. 29-30, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[17] Para. 31, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[18] Paras. 33-34, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[19] Para. 36, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_20061888_libertas.html.
[20] Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶97, retrieved on August 27, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[21] Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶153, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[22] “All things were made through him, and without him was made nothing that has been made.” John 1:3, Confraternity Edition, Catholic Book Publishing Company, New York, 1962.
[23] See also: Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2, retrieved on August 26, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html. (“God himself, in creating man in his own image, has written upon his heart the desire to see him. Even if this desire is often ignored, God never ceases to draw man to himself because only in God will he find and live the fullness of truth and happiness for which he never stops searching. By nature and by vocation, therefore, man is a religious being, capable of entering into communion with God. This intimate and vital bond with God confers on man his fundamental dignity. [Emphasis added.]”).
[24] “Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶1731, retrieved on August 27, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5N.HTM.
[25] “Martyrdom is the supreme witness given to the truth of the faith: it means bearing witness even unto death. the martyr bears witness to Christ who died and rose, to whom he is united by charity. He bears witness to the truth of the faith and of Christian doctrine. He endures death through an act of fortitude. “Let me become the food of the beasts, through whom it will be given me to reach God.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2473, retrieved on August 27, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P8J.HTM.
[26] “Every single thing owes its very existence to God from whom it receives its goodness and perfection, its proper laws and its proper place in the universe”; “Respecting the laws inscribed in creation and the relations which derive from the nature of things is, therefore, a principle of wisdom and a foundation for morality”; “Authority is exercised legitimately when it acts for the common good and employs morally licit means to attain it. Therefore, political regimes must be determined by the free decision of their citizens. They should respect the principle of the “rule of law” in which the law, and not the arbitrary will of some, is sovereign”; “All men and women according to the place and role that they occupy participate in promoting the common good by respecting just laws and taking charge of the areas for which they have personal responsibility such as the care of their own family and the commitment to their own work”; “It is the duty of the Magisterium of the Church to preach the faith that is to be believed and put into practice in life. This duty extends even to the specific precepts of the natural law because their observance is necessary for salvation.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Church, ¶¶ 62, 64, 406, 410, 430, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[27] “God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶1730, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5M.HTM.
[28] “The ultimate source of human rights is not found in the mere will of human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in man himself and in God his Creator.” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶153, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#The%20value%20of%20human%20rights.
[29] “The first commandment requires us to nourish and protect our faith with prudence and vigilance, and to reject everything that is opposed to it.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2088, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P7C.HTM.
[30] “The ultimate source of human rights is not found in the mere will of human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in man himself and in God his Creator. These rights are ‘universal, inviolable, inalienable.’ Universal because they are present in all human beings, without exception of time, place or subject. Inviolable insofar as ‘they are inherent in the human person and in human dignity’ and because ‘it would be vain to proclaim rights, if at the same time everything were not done to ensure the duty of respecting them by all people, everywhere, and for all people.’ Inalienable insofar as ‘no one can legitimately deprive another person, whoever they may be, of these rights, since this would do violence to their nature.’ [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶153, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[31] “A punishment imposed by legitimate public authority has the aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense, of defending public order and people’s safety, and contributing to the correction of the guilty party.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶468, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[32] “A just society can become a reality only when it is based on the respect of the transcendent dignity of the human person. The person represents the ultimate end of society, by which it is ordered to the person: ‘Hence, the social order and its development must invariably work to the benefit of the human person, since the order of things is to be subordinate to the order of persons, and not the other way around.’ [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶132, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[33] “Human rights are to be defended not only individually but also as a whole: protecting them only partially would imply a kind of failure to recognize them. They correspond to the demands of human dignity and entail, in the first place, the fulfilment of the essential needs of the person in the material and spiritual spheres. ‘These rights apply to every stage of life and to every political, social, economic and cultural situation. Together they form a single whole, directed unambiguously towards the promotion of every aspect of the good of both the person and society.’ [Internal footnote omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶154, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[34] ” Social too is every sin against the rights of the human person, starting with the right to life.” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶118, retrieved on August 28, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[35] “Freedom implies also the possibility of choosing between good and evil. The choice of evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to the slavery of sin.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Church, ¶363, retrieved on August 29, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[36] ” In fact, the roots of human rights are to be found in the dignity that belongs to each human being. This dignity, inherent in human life and equal in every person, is perceived and understood first of all by reason. The natural foundation of rights appears all the more solid when, in light of the supernatural, it is considered that human dignity, after having been given by God and having been profoundly wounded by sin, was taken on and redeemed by Jesus Christ in his incarnation, death and resurrection. [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Compendium of the Social Teaching of the Church, ¶153, retrieved on August 29, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[37] “The punishment imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Church, ¶469, retrieved on August 29, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.