Article 3
“Further light is shed on the subject if one considers that the highest norm of human life is the divine law—eternal, objective, and universal—whereby God orders, directs and governs the entire universe and all the ways of the human community by a plan conceived in wisdom and love.”
Here is language describing an objective standard, which was the very question lingering at the end of article 2. If an educated Catholic layperson were looking for a specification of the “just public order,” this would be it: just (“highest norm of human life”), public (the entire universe and all the ways of the human community), and order (“the divine law—eternal, objective, and universal—whereby God orders, directs and governs . . . by a plan conceived in wisdom and love”). Certainly an educated Catholic layperson would readily understand this clear statement of Church teaching.
“Man has been made by God to participate in this law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine Providence, he can come to perceive ever more fully the truth that is unchanging.”
Following the prior sentence, this sentence confirms the impression that the council fathers are setting out their vision of the just public order. When combined with article 1, an educated Catholic layperson would conclude humans are to “perceive ever more fully the truth” via the Catholic Church. As the council fathers stated in the earlier article: “We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men.” It would appear, then, that the council fathers mean humans “can come to perceive ever more fully the truth that is unchanging” precisely because, as they stated in article 1, the Church’s Magisterium[1] searches “into the sacred tradition and doctrine of the Church—the treasury out of which the Church continually brings forth new things that are in harmony with the things that are old.”
These passages again indicate that the fathers’ stated intent in article 2, “to develop” doctrine, is strongly constrained. Just as they did in article 1, the fathers speak of “the truth that is unchanging.” Change, as opposed to development, is apparently ruled out.
The reader then would naturally expect to be told the identity of the “truth that is unchanging.” When the document is read as a whole, it appears the Catholic faith is the only possible candidate. An educated Catholic layperson would therefore continue to wonder whether the “just public order” which limits immunity from coercion, as Art. 2 set out, is simply the Catholic order.
“Wherefore every man has the duty, and therefore the right, to seek the truth in matters religious in order that he may with prudence form for himself right and true judgments of conscience, under use of all suitable means.”
Here is the second mention of “conscience,” the third if “belief” in the second sentence in article 2 is translated as “conscience.” The council fathers will continue to speak of conscience in this article and afterwards, using it eight more times. Because “conscience” is not defined, however, the reader must decide in what sense the council fathers use the term.
“Truth, however, is to be sought after in a manner proper to the dignity of the human person and his social nature.”
As already noted, the council fathers come the closest to defining “dignity” in article 2, where they say humans are “beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore privileged to bear personal responsibility.” Here, they say truth is to be sought in a manner proper to that dignity. The inference is that truth is to be sought by reason and freewill in a way which conforms to personal responsibility.
Do the council fathers mean the truth should be sought by reason and freewill alone? No, because the fathers also teach humans are best guided by the Catholic Church. As they put it in article 1: “First, the council professes its belief that God Himself has made known to mankind the way in which men are to serve Him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness. We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men.”
An educated Catholic layperson would tend to conclude from these teachings that any who reject the truth, including the guidance of the Catholic Church, fail to maintain their dignity.[2] Article 2, however, suggested that even those who “do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it” retain enough dignity to be accorded religious liberty. How human dignity survives a purposeful rejection of the truth, how any residual dignity relates to full human dignity, and how such a residual is sufficient to support religious liberty, are never fully explained in the document.
“The inquiry is to be free, carried on with the aid of teaching or instruction, communication and dialogue, in the course of which men explain to one another the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to assist one another in the quest for the truth.”
In the converse of the document’s opening, where lauds for the “demands” of “contemporary man” swiftly cut to strong statements of the Church’s own authority, Article 3 opens with a description of the transcendent divine law as “the highest norm of human life” and then shifts to seemingly autonomous humans discussing the truth “they have discovered, or think they have discovered.”
The council fathers, however, do not acknowledge the rhetorical dynamic at issue—for many people, it is precisely the truth claims of the Catholic Church which stand in the way of the “free” inquiry the fathers say they want. Unless, of course, the council fathers have in mind the Catholic Church’s teachings and simply omit that reference from the present sentence. In other words, could the council fathers really have meant: “The inquiry is to be free [for ascertaining Catholic truth], carried on with the aid of teaching or instruction [by Catholic instructors], communication and dialogue [within Catholic institutions], in the course of which men [of the Church] explain to one another the truth they have discovered [within Church teaching], or think they have discovered [any error of course being corrected by Church authorities], in order thus to assist one another in the quest for the [Catholic] truth.” As unlikely as it seems from the tone of the document, the vagueness of the document permits this reading, or even encourages it as a means to resolve the continuous uncertainty.
“Moreover, as the truth is discovered, it is by a personal assent that men are to adhere to it.”
If “truth” here refers to the truth claims of Catholicism, this sentence would strike an educated Catholic layperson as a truism, almost a tautology.[3] It would be notable only for its omission of reference to the supernatural grace which enables personal assent to religious truth.[4] Since the implied contrast is between coercion and personal assent, the omission could be understandable.
If “truth” refers to the truth claims of another religion, however, then the omission of grace is expected. Grace would not support heresy or infidelity in the Catholic view. But then an educated Catholic layperson would wonder how a “truth” which did not exist could be “discovered.”
“On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience.”
The article opened with a firm description of the divine law, and the council fathers now state humans come to know that law through the mediation of their conscience. This usage implies that the conscience in question is true and good.
“In all his activity a man is bound to follow his conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life.”
Here as well, the implication is that the conscience is true and good—it binds humans to a path which ends in God. An educated Catholic layperson would not think an evil or false conscience could guide on such a path.[5] Although an educated Catholic would understand a person must follow his or her conscience, even if it is in error, such a person would also know that a false conscience may be false because of sin and is therefore subject to correction.[6]
“It follows that he is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience.”
Assume a person’s false conscience impels him or her to amputate a child’s healthy leg with a kitchen knife. Unlike in article 2, the council fathers do not limit the present statement regarding the sovereignty of conscience with a phrase like “within due limits” or “provided that just public order be observed.” Reading the entire document together, however, such limits are implicit, indicating again that the conscience at issue here is a good one. It does not appear the council fathers are saying a person may not be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience when that conscience is evil or false, as in the example just given.
If the fathers were saying that a person may not be forced to act in a manner contrary to his conscience when that conscience is evil or false, an educated Catholic layperson would be understandably confused.[7] The council fathers, in that situation, would be expected to clarify their use of the word “conscience.” As already stated, they do not do so, providing more support for the reading of “conscience” to mean “good and true conscience.”
But as also already stated, the textual reasons to read the council fathers’ words in a Catholic sense come up against their undeniably liberal tone. Moreover, as will be seen, later in the document they seem to embrace liberalism directly. The upshot of all this conflict is that the fathers fail to provide the context needed to certainly comprehend their meaning.
“Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious.”
As already noted, the practical difference between being forced to act contrary to conscience and being restrained from acting in accordance with conscience is not clear. Here, however, the council fathers add a qualifier to the specific instance of being restrained, “especially in matters religious.” The implication seems to be that the fathers are addressing an affirmative right of religious practice.
Unfortunately, the word “religious” is still undefined. In addition to wondering whether the council fathers meant a true or false conscience, now the reader must wonder whether the council fathers meant a true or false religion. For reasons already set out, an educated Catholic layperson would think the fathers meant a true conscience about the true religion, but such a person would also see that other readings are possible.
“The reason is that the exercise of religion, by its very nature, consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God.”
As a perfect example of the problem just mentioned, consider this sentence. What “exercise of religion [abstract noun], by its very nature” sets the life of a person “directly toward God”? An educated Catholic layperson would say the Catholic religion and none other. No citation is required here because Dignitiatis humanae says as much in article 1: “First, this council professes its belief that God Himself has made known to mankind the way in which men are to serve Him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness. We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men.” Only one “religion” (singular concrete noun) properly fulfills the category of “religion” (abstract noun) for Catholics: Catholicism.
That is the close reading of the text. But is it what the document actually says? If so, Dignitatis humanae is a very successful misdirection play. Consider the next sentence to see another application of the close reading versus tone phenomenon.
“No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind.(3)”
“[A]cts of this kind” presumably refers to the prior sentence, specifically “those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God.” The prior sentence called such acts “the exercise of religion,” which, as explained, an educated Catholic layperson could read to mean the exercise of Catholicism. If so, the present sentence would distinguish the Catholic Church from any “merely human power.”
To confirm or deny this reading, it is important to define a “merely human power” The council fathers do not provide a definition, but they do provide a footnote, the third of the document. They again cite Pacem in Terris,and also a 1964 radio message of Pope Paul VI.
On the page of Pacem in Terris cited, the following passages occur:
“Hence, a regime which governs solely or mainly by means of threats and intimidation or promises of reward, provides men with no effective incentive to work for the common good. And even if it did, it would certainly be offensive to the dignity of free and rational human beings. Authority is before all else a moral force. For this reason the appeal of rulers should be to the individual conscience, to the duty which every man has of voluntarily contributing to the common good. But since all men are equal in natural dignity, no man has the capacity to force internal compliance on another. Only God can do that, for He alone scrutinizes and judges the secret counsels of the heart.
Hence, representatives of the State have no power to bind men in conscience, unless their own authority is tied to God’s authority, and is a participation in it. [Internal footnote omitted.]”[8]
These passages from Pacem in Terris establish two thing: First, governments can bind in conscience, but second, they do so only when acting in the exercise of and in accordance with God’s authority. It therefore appears a “merely human power” would be a government which eschews the divine source of and guide for its acts, the latter being, again, the Catholic Church.
The implication is that a government which does recognize God and act accordingly can command or prohibit the exercise of religion. Such a government would, in that instance, not be a “merely human power.” It would operate with the authority given to it by God, and as such, it could bind in conscience if, the context suggests, it operated under the guidance of the Catholic Church.
This close reading is consistent with some offered above, but it again strikes against the tone of the document thus far. And yet if that is not what the council fathers intended, it is unclear why they cited John XXIII. Consideration of Paul VI’s radio message may add something, but research located no English translation of the Italian text.[9]
“The social nature of man, however, itself requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of religion: that he should share with others in matters religious; that he should profess his religion in community.”
It would be important here to know just what the council fathers thought “religion” as an abstract noun (first usage) and “religious” as an adjective (second usage) signify. The sentence also features use of “religion” as a singular concrete noun (third usage), but does that mean any religion at all? In other words, is the singular concrete noun broader than the abstract noun and adjective appear to be upon a possible close reading? Or are the abstract noun and the adjective as broad as the singular concrete noun can be here, assuming the latter means any religion? These questions are unanswerable, but at least the reader knows the council fathers thought religion has a social dimension.
“Injury therefore is done to the human person and to the very order established by God for human life, if the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided just public order is observed.”
“Order” is mentioned twice here, which could suggest a similar meaning for each use. The first usage, “the very order established by God for human life,” is set together with “the human person” in a way which suggests the “order” in question is simply society, especially when the prior sentence is considered (“the social nature of man,” etc.) The second usage, “just public order,” has been used before in a way which suggests to an educated Catholic layperson that a Catholic order is meant. Taking these together, it would appear that “the very order established by God for human life” and the “just public order” equivalently mean Catholicism.
If so, then the “free exercise of religion” would mean the free exercise of Catholicism. The council fathers, however, first mentioned “the free exercise of religion” in the opening lines of Dignitatis humanae, where they included it among the demands made by “contemporary man.” It seems unlikely the council fathers intended “contemporary man” as a stand-in for “Catholics.” The category “contemporary man” seems too broad for that meaning, and so “the free exercise of religion” should similarly have a broader meaning. However, since the council fathers never state whether their intended audience includes non-Catholics, it is impossible to rule out that “contemporary man” simply means contemporary Catholics, as unlikely as it may appear. Suggesting, once again, that the council fathers intended a free exercise of religion for Catholics, and not others, provided the just public order be preserved.
“There is a further consideration. The religious acts whereby men, in private and in public and out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to God transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs.”
The adjective “religious,” which modifies the subject “acts,” is not defined, as already noted, but the subject is modified further in this sentence: “whereby men . . . direct their lives to God.” The mind of the council fathers could be revealed if an educated Catholic layperson knew the sort of religion which directs lives to God.
The pattern is quite familiar by now. To an educated Catholic layperson, there is only one religion which directs lives to God, and that is Catholicism.[10] The present sentence therefore fits the earlier sentence in the same article: “No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this kind.” The teaching would appear to be that Catholicism transcends the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs, but not other religions, which are not, as the council fathers taught in article 1, established by “God Himself,” i.e., “the one true religion [which] subsists in the Catholic and Apostolic Church.”
It is equally clear, however, that a person who does not read the present sentence as an educated Catholic layperson might would not see such a meaning. How did the council fathers intend the sentence to be read? They do not clearly indicate.
“Government therefore ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favor, since the function of government is to make provision for the common welfare.”
Here is another clue to what “religion” means, this time in the adjectival form “religious”—it is part of the “common welfare.” The Latin original, “bonum commune,”[11] is more typically translated “common good.” The common good is a familiar concept to the educated Catholic laity.[12] It includes all human goods, including the “spiritual . . . goods of persons and societies.”[13]
However, do the council fathers mean that all religions (concrete noun) support the common good? Are some religions (concrete noun) merely indifferent, or even contrary to that good? To which religions (concrete noun) specifically should the government show favor? Should a government show favor to a religion (concrete noun) which is not true? If so, how would that support the common good? If there is only one true religion (concrete noun), as the council fathers said in article 1, then should not the government favor it and not others?
The council fathers do not answer these questions. They are consistent, then, when they use “religion” as an abstract noun and “religious” as an adjective without definition. If they did define what they meant, they would have to evaluate the various examples of the concrete noun under the same standard. But if they did so, it could appear to an educated Catholic layperson that the council fathers were speaking of Catholicism alone, which does not appear to be the impression they intended.
“However, it would clearly transgress the limits set to its power, were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are religious.”
Rhetorically, this sentence sets up an interesting comparison with the “just public order” and “due limits” language in article 2. The present sentence speaks, after all, of “limits” to government power. Are the council fathers referring to the same limits in all instances?
One might think so, because the prior references to the “just public order” and “due limits” seemed to acknowledge that government has some power in religious matters. Otherwise, how could government establish order or set limits? Imagine, for example, a Marian procession wishing to use a road crowded with Muslim worshipers during the call to prayer, or a church wishing to expand contrary to zoning which protects land adjacent to a transcendental meditation garden. To resolve such disputes the government must decide between competing religious claims; the fact is unavoidable.[14]
However, the limit at issue in article 3 is not a limit to personal immunity from government coercion, as in article 2, but a limit to the power of government itself. It is the language of jurisdiction—the government “clearly transgress the limits set to its power, were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are religious. [Emphasis added.]” The sentence which led this paragraph contains the same idea: “The religious acts whereby men, in private and in public and out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to God transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial and temporal affairs. [Emphasis added.]”
The language of these sentences is absolute, unlike the article 2 limits on immunity. The meaning here seems to be that while government has jurisdiction to show favor to religion (the prior sentence,) it does not have jurisdiction to command or inhibit religious acts (the present sentence). The assertion is confusing in part because “religious” is still undefined, but also because an educated Catholic layperson would think, as just explained, that government must command and inhibit under law.
In light of the absolute, jurisdictional language of the present sentence, what of those instances where a government must command or inhibit acts that are religious, or else accept religious conflict? Would a government clearly transgress the limits set to its powers if it were to command the Marian procession to occur before the call to prayer, or if it were to command the Muslim worshipers to give way? Would a government clearly transgress its limits if it prohibited church expansion onto land adjacent to the meditation center?
An educated Catholic layperson would not think so. As already set out, for such a person the government is tasked with protecting the common good, which includes the spiritual good of persons and societies. So, either the language of the present sentence cannot be implemented in real life, or it tacitly incorporates a Catholic worldview which defers such questions to the Church and asks governments to follow Her lead.[15] It is impossible to say which is more (or less) likely.
Conclusion to article 3
The oscillation initiated in article 1, and developed in article 2, continues in article 3. The tone of Dignitiatis humanae is broad, liberal or, in places, almost religiously indifferent. All religions are worthy of respect, the document seems to say, and governments must give way. But other language is not so broad, and suddenly an educated Catholic layperson wonders whether the broad language, to be coherent, must be read in light of the narrow language. And yet if that is done, the document’s meaning diverges so much from its tone that an educated Catholic layperson must hesitate, wondering whether something so audacious was intended. Did the council fathers really mean to say “Catholicism” whenever they wrote “religion” or “religious”? It is as though the council fathers wanted to be liberal, but remained Catholic, and so confused everyone.
[1] “The task of giving an authentic interpretation of the deposit of faith has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone, that is, to the successor of Peter, the Bishop of Rome, and to the bishops in communion with him. To this Magisterium, which in the service of the Word of God enjoys the certain charism of truth, belongs also the task of defining dogmas which are formulations of the truths contained in divine Revelation. This authority of the Magisterium also extends to those truths necessarily connected with Revelation.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶16, retrieved on September 1, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[2] “The dignity of a human person requires the uprightness of a moral conscience (which is to say that it be in accord with what is just and good according to reason and the law of God).” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶373, retrieved on September 1, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[3] “God himself, in creating man in his own image, has written upon his heart the desire to see him. Even if this desire is often ignored, God never ceases to draw man to himself because only in God will he find and live the fullness of truth and happiness for which he never stops searching. By nature and by vocation, therefore, man is a religious being, capable of entering into communion with God. This intimate and vital bond with God confers on man his fundamental dignity.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2, retrieved on September 1, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[4] “Sustained by divine grace, we respond to God with the obedience of faith, which means the full surrender of ourselves to God and the acceptance of his truth insofar as it is guaranteed by the One who is Truth itself.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶25, retrieved on September 1, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[5] “Moral conscience, present in the heart of the person, is a judgment of reason which at the appropriate moment enjoins him to do good and to avoid evil. Thanks to moral conscience, the human person perceives the moral quality of an act to be done or which has already been done, permitting him to assume responsibility for the act. When attentive to moral conscience, the prudent person can hear the voice of God who speaks to him or her.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Church, ¶372, retrieved on September 8, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[6] “A human being must always obey the certain judgment of his conscience. If he were deliberately to act against it, he would condemn himself. Yet it can happen that moral conscience remains in ignorance and makes erroneous judgments about acts to be performed or already committed. This ignorance can often be imputed to personal responsibility. This is the case when a man ‘takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin.’ In such cases, the person is culpable for the evil he commits. [Internal footnote omitted.]” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶¶1790-1791, retrieved on September 8, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P62.HTM.
[7] ” As far as possible conscience should take account of the good of all, as expressed in the moral law, natural and revealed, and consequently in the law of the Church and in the authoritative teaching of the Magisterium on moral questions. Personal conscience and reason should not be set in opposition to the moral law or the Magisterium of the Church.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2039, retrieved on September 8, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P74.HTM#FQ.
[8] Para. 48-49, retrieved on September 9, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; 55 Acta Apostolicae Sedis (1963), p. 270, retrieved on September 9, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf.
[9] Radiomessaggio Natalizio di Sua Santità Paolo VI, Martedì, 22 dicembre. Retrieved on September 9, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/it/speeches/1964/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19641222_radiomessaggio-natale.html
[10] “‘Outside the Church there is no salvation’ How are we to understand this affirmation, often repeated by the Church Fathers? Re-formulated positively, it means that all salvation comes from Christ the Head through the Church which is his Body: ‘Basing itself on Scripture and Tradition, the Council teaches that the Church, a pilgrim now on earth, is necessary for salvation: the one Christ is the mediator and the way of salvation; he is present to us in his body which is the Church. He himself explicitly asserted the necessity of faith and Baptism, and thereby affirmed at the same time the necessity of the Church which men enter through Baptism as through a door. Hence they could not be saved who, knowing that the Catholic Church was founded as necessary by God through Christ, would refuse either to enter it or to remain in it.’ [Internal footnotes omitted.]” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶846, retrieved on September 12, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P29.HTM#2PL.
[11] Retrieved on September 21, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_lt.html.
[12] “By the common good is meant the sum total of those conditions of social life which allow people as groups and as individuals to reach their proper fulfillment.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶407, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[13]Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶408, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.
[14] ” The rights and duties of the person contain a concise summary of the principal moral and juridical requirements that must preside over the construction of the political community. These requirements constitute an objective norm on which positive law is based and which cannot be ignored by the political community, because both in existential being and in final purpose the human person precedes the political community. Positive law must guarantee that fundamental human needs are met.” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, ¶388, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.
[15] “Only the divinely revealed religion has clearly recognized man’s origin and destiny in God, the Creator and Redeemer. the Church invites political authorities to measure their judgments and decisions against this inspired truth about God and man: ‘Societies not recognizing this vision or rejecting it in the name of their independence from God are brought to seek their criteria and goal in themselves or to borrow them from some ideology. Since they do not admit that one can defend an objective criterion of good and evil, they arrogate to themselves an explicit or implicit totalitarian power over man and his destiny, as history shows.’ [Internal footnote omitted.]” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2244, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P7W.HTM.