What Does Dignitatis humanae Say? A Rhetorical Investigation

Article 5

“The family, since it is a society in its own original right, has the right freely to live its own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents.”

          The document, thus far, has dealt with individuals and communities in relation to government. The council fathers now mention the family, and a non-Catholic reader may miss the importance of the distinction. As the fathers state, the family “is a society in its own original right,” meaning that, in its own sphere, it has in some ways a status akin to government itself. This is a concept familiar to the educated Catholic laity.[1]

“Parents, moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own religious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive.”

          After ending article 4 with a reference to “their own religious sense,” the council fathers now refer to “their own religious beliefs.” The first, as explained above, could mean a sense about the objective religious truth. The second, however, suggests a plurality of possible beliefs.

          Is it significant that when the council fathers spoke of government, they did not so clearly refer to a plurality of beliefs? A close reading has shown the fathers sounded relativistic but arguably remained absolutist with respect to government and religion. They did not necessarily depart from their article 1 assertion that Catholicism is the “one true religion,” even when they seemed to do so in articles 2-4.

          Now, however, the council fathers refer to an actual choice among religious beliefs, and they call it a “right.” Several things are notable. The council fathers did not give the right to children, but to parents. That fact alone shows the fathers were not advocates for absolute religious freedom. Someone must decide, they agreed, and they gave the decision to those in authority over the unit in question, the family.

          Their language also shows they could refer directly to religious plurality when they wanted. Since they did so here, they could have done so earlier, if that was their intent. The educated Catholic laity, for their part, would not be surprised to see more direct language here. The rights of parents to control the religious education of their children is well-understood in Catholicism and did not need to be developed in the document.[2]

          Moreover, one could infer from this sentence and the rest of the article that the religious freedom of citizens with respect to their government is not as broad as that of parents over their children. Notice the lack of limits here, such as “just public order.” The council fathers seem to give parents discretion over religion issues more readily than they do to citizens.

“Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free choice of schools and of other means of education, and the use of this freedom of choice is not to be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on parents, whether directly or indirectly.”

          A very general sentence which states some implications of the prior one.

“Besides, the right of parents are violated, if their children are forced to attend lessons or instructions which are not in agreement with their religious beliefs, or if a single system of education, from which all religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all.”

          “[F]orced to attend lessons or instructions which are not in agreement with their religious beliefs” apparently means against the will and beliefs of the parents, not the children. If parents consent, coercion of children in religious matters is apparently acceptable. Why such coercion is acceptable, and other forms are not, is left unaddressed. The council fathers’ earlier emphasis on conscience, for example, is missing from article 5.   

          The council fathers also seem to make a relatively narrow use of the adjective “religious,” and by inference the abstract noun “religion,” when they assume an education system can in fact exclude “all religious formation.” How narrow that use is cannot be determined, however. For example, what would an education system that excludes “all religious formation” look like? Did the council fathers mean communistic school systems, which in fact impose state worship? And what about liberal school systems which preach the power of the state over innocent human life (abortion) and over fundamental human institutions (marriage)? Do not these school systems similarly impose state worship? If so, does state worship enjoy the same freedoms as other religions? If it does not, what is required before a belief system qualifies for religious freedom? These questions are never answered in Dignitatis humanae.     

Comment on article 5

          The just society contemplated by the council fathers permits religious plurality among homes. Here, parents are masters. But if God allows people to coerce other people, so long as the coerced are children to the coercers, why would He not allow coercion with respect to people who are children to Him? If parents are masters within the home, even in the cause of error, are there no masters outside the home, even in the cause of truth? Article 5 stands apart from the rest of document and does not engage these questions.         


[1] “The family is the original cell of human society and is, therefore, prior to any recognition by public authority.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶457, retrieved on September 17, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.

[2]“The right and the duty of parents to educate their children are primordial and inalienable.” Catechism of the Catholic Church, ¶2221, retrieved on September 19, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_P7U.HTM#JL.