What Does Dignitatis humanae Say? A Rhetorical Investigation

Article 6

“Since the common welfare of society consists in the entirety of those conditions of social life under which men enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in a certain fullness of measure and also with some relative ease, it chiefly consists in the protection of the rights, and in the performance of the duties, of the human person.(4)”

          Here is the second use of “common welfare,” or common good. As set out above, an educated Catholic layperson would include the spiritual good of persons and societies within the common good. The word “perfection” communicates the same thing.[1]

          This understanding of “common good” is confirmed by the fourth footnote. It cites two encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris. In the first encyclical, the pope noted the common good “must take account of all those social conditions which favor the full development of human personality.”[2] In the second encyclical, the pontiff expanded on his meaning:

“In this connection, We would draw the attention of Our own sons to the fact that the common good is something which affects the needs of the whole man, body and soul. That, then, is the sort of good which rulers of States must take suitable measure to ensure. They must respect the hierarchy of values, and aim at achieving the spiritual as well as the material prosperity of their subjects.

These principles are clearly contained in that passage in Our encyclical Mater et Magistra where We emphasized that the common good ‘must take account of all those social conditions which favor the full development of human personality.’

Consisting, as he does, of body and immortal soul, man cannot in this mortal life satisfy his needs or attain perfect happiness. Thus, the measures that are taken to implement the common good must not jeopardize his eternal salvation; indeed, they must even help him to obtain it. [Internal footnotes omitted.]”[3]

          Given this footnote and all which comes before it, the “common welfare” of “contemporary man” includes religion. Could the religion in question be in doubt? Earlier in Dignitatis humanae, the council fathers indicated that Catholicism is the religion which would “not jeopardize [man’s] eternal salvation” but “help him to obtain it.” Why, then, did the council fathers not specify Catholicism if that was their meaning, and if not, explain how other religions could serve just as well? 

          Instead, the council fathers end this sentence with reference to the rights and duties “of the human person.” This sounds humanistic, even secular. Here again, the tone of the document does not match a narrow reading. What author, even a corporate one such as a Church council, could tolerate a repeated clash between the tone and the technical meaning of a text? What rhetorical goal could justify such an approach? And of all rhetorical goals, could one possibly believe that teaching was among them?

“Therefore the care of the right to religious freedom devolves upon the whole citizenry, upon social groups, upon government, and upon the Church and other religious communities, in virtue of the duty of all toward the common welfare, and in the manner proper to each.”

          The council fathers mention “the Church and other religious communities.” In article 4, the first place “religious communities” are mentioned, the council fathers omit the reference to “the Church.” Why is “the Church” mentioned here? Does “religious communities” used alone not include “the Church”? That seems unlikely given “the Church” is now grouped with “other religious communities.”

          Hence, what is the connection between “the Church” and the “other religious communities” which allows them to be so grouped? Two options come to mind. First, “the Church” is one of many “religious communities,” all of different faiths. Second, “the Church” is a “religious community” with many  subsidiary groups, all of which are Catholic.

          Thus far, a facial reading of the document supports the first option. Reading the document closely, however, one must ask whether the second option is not just as valid. Here, for example, an educated Catholic layperson would not think a false religion has a duty “toward the common welfare,” which Catholics believe includes the spiritual good of people and society, unless that duty would require it to abstain from preaching false doctrine and interfering with the preaching of Catholic doctrine, or, more properly, would require it abandon falsehood altogether and come into the Church.[4]

          As mentioned in the conclusion to article 4, the council fathers must have possessed the capacity to make their meaning clear. It would have been easy to write, “the Church and other communities based on different religious beliefs,” if that were their meaning. Such a formulation would have ensured the reader understood that the fathers were speaking of the various world religions. They did not do so, however, and one must wonder why.

“The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks among the essential duties of government.(5)”

          Here is a straightforward statement of government responsibility. The footnote cites Pacem in Terris and also a radio message of Pope Pius XII. The cited passage of Pacem in Terris quotes in turn the radio message:

“It is generally accepted today that the common good is best safeguarded when personal rights and duties are guaranteed. The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that these rights are recognized, respected, co-ordinated, defended and promoted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties more easily. For “to safeguard the inviolable rights of the human person, and to facilitate the performance of his duties, is the principal duty of every public authority. [Footnote omitted.]”[5]

          The cited material provides another mention of the common good. If the common good is safeguarded when the government guarantees personal, inviolable rights, and if the common good includes the spiritual good of a person, is it not necessary to infer that government has an essential duty to protect and promote Catholicism? The council fathers do not say so explicitly, but still they cite this language. Why cite the language but not clearly incorporate its meaning?

“Therefore government is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means.”

          Despite their earlier statement that governments lack jurisdiction over religion, the council fathers now direct government to protect religious freedom. May government use coercion? Apparently so, given references to “an effective manner,” “just laws,” and “other appropriate means.” Okay, but what is “religious freedom,” so that governments may know where “religion” ends (over which the government lacks jurisdiction), and religious freedom (over which government has jurisdiction) begins? Should not the council fathers explain what they mean by “religion” so government can act accordingly? If my religion requires me to confess Jesus Christ is Lord, but another religion requires its adherents to kill me upon making such a confession, which religion wins? How does the government apportion religious liberty between the contestants, given the council fathers say government must “safeguard . . . the religious freedom of all its citizens”? Someone must be coerced in these situations, and does religious liberty mean that error possesses the same immunity from coercion as truth? If so, why? And if not, why not? One is driven to ask, in exasperation, whether the council fathers seriously expected an educated Catholic layperson to derive a clear answer from Dignitatis humanae.   

“Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties, and also in order that society itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their origin in men’s faithfulness to God and His holy will. (6).”

          Another example of the problem just noted. What religion, an educated Catholic layperson might think, provides society with “the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their origin in men’s faithfulness to God and His holy will”? If such a person attends to Church teaching, there is only one—Catholicism.

          And yet, is that what the document says? The council fathers appended a footnote here for assistance. They cited only one document, an encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei.[6] The council fathers cited the first page of the encyclical, which runs as follows: 

“The Catholic Church, that imperishable handiwork of our all-merciful God, has for her immediate and natural purpose the saving of souls and securing our happiness in heaven. Yet, in regard to things temporal, she is the source of benefits as manifold and great as if the chief end of her existence were to ensure the prospering of our earthly life. And, indeed, wherever the Church has set her foot she has straightway changed the face of things, and has attempered the moral tone of the people with a new civilization and with virtues before unknown. All nations which have yielded to her sway have become eminent by their gentleness, their sense of justice, and the glory of their high deeds.

And yet a hackneyed reproach of old date is levelled against her, that the Church is opposed to the rightful aims of the civil government, and is wholly unable to afford help in spreading that welfare and progress which justly and naturally are sought after by every well-regulated State. From the very beginning Christians were harassed by slanderous accusations of this nature, and on that account were held up to hatred and execration, for being (so they were called) enemies of the Empire. The Christian religion was moreover commonly charged with being the cause of the calamities that so frequently befell the State, whereas, in very truth, just punishment was being awarded to guilty nations by an avenging God. This odious calumny, with most valid reason, nerved the genius and sharpened the pen of St. Augustine, who, notably in his treatise, The City of God, set forth in so bright a light the worth of Christian wisdom in its relation to the public wealth that he seems not merely to have pleaded the cause of the Christians of his day, but to have refuted for all future times impeachments so grossly contrary to truth. The wicked proneness, however, to levy like charges and accusations has not been lulled to rest. Many, indeed, are they who have tried to work out a plan of civil society based on doctrines other than those approved by the Catholic Church. Nay, in these latter days a novel conception of law has begun here and there to gain increase and influence, the outcome, as it is maintained, of an age arrived at full stature, and the result of progressive liberty. But, though endeavours of various kinds have been ventured on, it is clear that no better mode has been devised for the building up and ruling the State than that which is the necessary growth of the teachings of the Gospel.”[7]

          Nothing in this quote suggests the council fathers meant government could foster “religious life” by promoting anything apart from Catholicism. But if that was their intent, why did they not say it? The confusion is terminal.  

“If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.”

           As already established, the meaning of “religious communities” is unclear. If “religious communities” means particular communities within Catholicism, then the continuity of this sentence with the teaching found in Libertas Praestntissimum, Immortale Dei, and certain other sentences in Dignitatis humanae itself is clear. In that case, however, the tone of Dignitatis humanae is unaccountable. If “religious communities” is read to mean different religions, the continuity with the material mentioned is very unclear, but the tone of Dignitatis humanae would make sense. Neither option appears fully justified by the text and footnotes of Dignitatis humanae, however.

“Finally, government is to see to it that equality before the law, which is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or covertly, for religious reasons.”

          If a Catholic institution treats applicants for a theology teaching position differently based on religious reasons, such as adherence to Catholicism, is that a violation of equality before the law?

“Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.”

          What about discriminating against women on admission to the priesthood, or against married men on admission to the priesthood, or against two men or two women on admission to marriage? This broad sentence, and the one prior, make sense if read from a purely Catholic perspective, i.e., read to mean what Catholics mean by equality before the law and lack of discrimination. But the council fathers repeatedly failed to say so.

“It follows that a wrong is done when government imposes upon its people, by force or fear or other means, the profession or repudiation of any religion, or when it hinders men from joining or leaving a religious community.”

          Here, for the first time in the document, “religion” as a singular concrete noun is used as an equivalent to the plural concrete noun:  “any religion” = “religions.” But notice the context. The issue is not mere coercion but “force or fear.” True, the council fathers talk of “other means,” but when combined with the two specified means and the verb “imposes,” the notion is something stronger than coercion. Furthermore, the question is not the practice or teaching of a faith, but “the profession or repudiation” of a faith. In other words, government cannot force a person’s conscience with respect to religious belief, a notion familiar to an educated Catholic layperson.[8]

          So, what about “joining or leaving a religious community”? It of course depends on the meaning of “religious community.” As they did in article 4, the council fathers do not here add “Church” to “religious community.” So is the Church left out of the analysis, and a government may hinder anyone from leaving Catholicism, something Catholic governments did for years with the approval of the Church? If not, how does Dignitatis humanae leave “untouched” the traditional Catholic teaching on the duties of individuals and society to the one, true, religion? Or, once again, did the council fathers mean the various religious communities within Catholicism?

          Let’s take a current example. There is now, apparently, a “church of Satan” with sacraments (abortion) and social clubs in some public high schools. Would a government do wrong by hindering people from joining such a religious community? If not, why not? Is the church of Satan a “religious community” in the first place? If not, why not? Since the uncertainty is rooted in the document’s sloppy usage and lack of definitions, it is unclear how an educated Catholic layperson is expected to decide any of these questions.

“All the more is it a violation of the will of God and of the sacred rights of the person and the family of nations when force is brought to bear in any way in order to destroy or repress religion, either in the whole of mankind or in a particular country or in a definite community.”

          This sentence features a particular use of an abstract noun. “[R]eligion” means the category generally, but the phrasing indicates there are a number of items in that group, especially when read in conjunction with the immediately prior sentence. Stated another way, the sentence deals with religion generally, but the teaching applies to any religion specifically. If that is so, however, then how does one reconcile the use of “religion” here with other uses which seem to indicate Catholicism alone? This point is not trivial or easily elided given the very solemn invocation in this sentence of God’s will and sacred human rights. Did Churchmen previously violate God’s will and sacred human rights when they repressed, directly or indirectly, paganism and heresies, for example? And would Christendom have been possible without it?

          However that question is resolved, the council fathers seem to assume Catholicism and all other religions may flourish in the same time and place. Are the council fathers correct in this? It would be interesting to hear what Catholics throughout the ages who were oppressed by the cults of Caesar, Manicheanism, Islam, Albigensianism, Protestantism, Freemasonry, Nazism, Communism, or Progressivism, might have to say. 

Conclusion to section 6

   The section seems to deal with government specifically, but with all of the prior uncertainty in place. At some point, it must be admitted, repeatedly asking questions of material that repeatedly fails to answer becomes tedious.   


[1] ” Every single thing owes its very existence to God from whom it receives its goodness and perfection, its proper laws and its proper place in the universe.” ¶62, Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.

[2] Mater et Magistra, ¶65, retrieved September 24, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater.html; Acta Apostolica Sedis 53 (1961), p. 414, retrieved September 24, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-53-1961-ocr.pdf. Pacem in Terris,

[3] Pacem in Terris, ¶¶57-59, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 55 (1963), p. 273, retrieved on September 24, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf.

[4] “It is the duty of the Magisterium of the Church to preach the faith that is to be believed and put into practice in life. This duty extends even to the specific precepts of the natural law because their observance is necessary for salvation.” Compendium of the Catechism of the Church, ¶430, retrieved on September 25, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html.

[5] Retrieved on September 25, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 55 (1963), pp. 273-274, retrieved on September 25, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/aas/documents/AAS-55-1963-ocr.pdf.

[6] The footnote mistakenly cites the “AAS,” or Acta Apostolicae Sedis, and not the “ASS,” or Acta Sanctae Sedis.

[7] Retrieved on November 15, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei.html; Acta Apostolicae Sedis 18 (1885), p. 161, retrieved on November 15, 2020, from:  http://www.vatican.va/archive/ass/documents/ASS-18-1885-ocr.pdf.

[8] “Society and the State must not force a person to act against his conscience or prevent him from acting in conformity with it.” Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, para. 21. Retrieved January 7, 2024, from https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html.